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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider the task of inferring the social interactions between humans
by analyzing multi-modal data. Specifically, we attempt to solve some of the problems
in interaction analysis, such as long-term deception detection, political deception
detection, and impression prediction. In this work, we emphasize the importance of
using knowledge about the group structure of the analyzed interactions. Previous
works on the matter mostly neglected this aspect and analyzed a single subject at a
time.
Using the new Resistance dataset, collected by our collaborators, we approach the
problem of long-term deception detection by designing a class of histogram-based
features and a novel class of meta-features we call LiarRank. We develop a LiarOrNot
model to identify spies in Resistance videos. We achieve AUCs of over 0.70 outperforming our baselines by 3% and human judges by 12%.
For the problem of political deception, we first collect a dataset of videos and transcripts of 76 politicians from 18 countries making truthful and deceptive statements.
We call it the Global Political Deception Dataset. We then show how to analyze the
statements in a broader context by building a Video-Article-Topic graph. From this
graph, we create a novel class of features called Deception Score that captures how
controversial each topic is and how it affects the truthfulness of each statement. We
show that our approach achieves 0.775 AUC outperforming competing baselines.
Finally, we use the Resistance data to solve the problem of dyadic impression prediction. Our proposed Dyadic Impression Prediction System (DIPS) contains four major
innovations: a novel class of features called emotion ranks, sign imbalance features
derived from signed graphs theory, a novel method to align the facial expressions of
subjects, and finally, we propose the concept of a multilayered stochastic network we
call Temporal Delayed Network. Our DIPS architecture beats eight baselines from
the literature, yielding statistically significant improvements of 19.9-30.8% in AUC.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Motivation

Aristotle called humans “political animals”2 implying that we are more social than
any other species. Indeed, many social psychologists think that humans evolved to be
social [91, 28], as that provides a lot of evolutionary benefits such as protection from
predators, psychological well-being, increased mating capabilities, and others. It is
not surprising that homo sapiens also developed ways of exploiting these interactions:
we try to make good impressions to make friends, we express our displeasure to affect
others, we lie to each other, we dominate or submit whenever it is beneficial for our
goals.
Social interactions permeate human lives. Each day we engage in various interactions
that can vary in multiple ways: in the number of people interacting (from talking oneon-one with someone to giving a talk in front of a thousand people), in the medium of
interaction (e.g., face-to-face discussion in the same room, video conferences, or even
text messaging), in the incentives behind the exchange (adversarial or collaborative),
and others.
Naturally, humans always wanted to be able to predict other humans’ behavior. These
days it is not unusual to see articles in popular and social media titled “How to Tell
If Someone Is Lying to You”3 or “How to Tell If Someone Likes You”4 . By observing
many human subjects, psychologists have discovered some cues that can help uncover
a person’s thoughts, attitudes, inner state and potentially predict her future actions.
In the age of Big Data, it is not surprising to see Machine Learning heavily influencing
the area of automated behavior analysis. It has been successfully applied to deception
detection [95, 158, 122], anxiety prediction [114, 59, 55], dominance and leadership
2

Aristotle., and Trevor J. Saunders. Politics. Books I and II . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Print.
3
https://time.com/5443204/signs-lying-body-language-experts/
4
https://www.scienceofpeople.com/someone-likes-you/
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analysis [131, 131, 10, 5, 105, 106], personality traits prediction [51, 16, 107], and
other areas of computational social science.
This research has some potential real-life applications. Deception detection is already
used in law enforcement [57] but has potential use in the military, intelligence agencies, and even in commercial organizations. There are numerous use cases for this
task: from interrogating potential terrorists and verifying the good intentions of visa
applicants to assessing the integrity of business partners or even questioning a cheating partner. Of course, improvements in deception detection accuracy raise several
moral and ethical concerns. We discuss them in Chapter 6.
Impression prediction and social dynamics analysis can be used to understand the
interaction and attitudes within a group of people (e.g., a project team or sports
team), which can help improve a group’s performance [108, 47, 90]. Another area
of interest is automated job interview assessment [69, 102] where video recordings of
one-on-one interviews are used to predict whether the candidate will get hired. This
task is helpful to reduce human bias during the hiring process and improve hiring
managers’ skills. We can also apply the learned properties in a generative setting:
building more human-like virtual assistants possessing artificial emotional intelligence
and exhibiting realistic group behavior.
As we have mentioned above, computational social science received a lot of attention
in the past decade. Nevertheless, these tasks remain challenging for several reasons.
First, Machine Learning and especially Deep Learning approaches are hungry for data,
but the data is lacking. Existing datasets for deception detection are either restricted
in modalities (text-only [116] or audio-only [101]), or relatively small in size (on the
order of 100–200 samples or less) [122, 52, 63]. This problem arises because it is (1)
hard to define precisely what deception is, (2) expensive to run human experiments,
(3) hard to find publicly available data with low noise levels and existing reliable
annotations. The same challenges exist for other social interaction datasets.
Second, because of the lack of data, researchers cannot efficiently use contemporary
computational techniques (e.g., Deep Learning) to learn useful representations automatically. They have to refer to psychological and social sciences for inspiration.
The majority of works on deception detection and interaction analysis use features
previously discovered by psychologists to be relevant for the task at hand. These
features include prosodic and acoustic properties such as pitch [101, 173], speaking
activity features such as the number of turns or utterance rate [31, 15], statistical
2
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linguistic properties such as word categories frequency [134, 84], visual features such
as facial expression units [158, 138, 107].
Very few works make use of the group nature of social interactions, however. In
fact, very few datasets reflect this common property in the first place. Only several
deception detection datasets depict group deception [162, 39, 31] despite the latter
being very common in real-life (from international summits to business negotiations).
Yu et al. [162] use the network properties of the group to detect a cluster of liars. Most
recent works by Kumar et al. [86] and Wang et al. [155] use gaze network properties to
predict multiple social features such as deception, dominance, and others. But most of
the other papers on deception detection use only the potential liar’s individual features
to predict dishonesty. In the area of personality traits prediction and interpersonal
attitudes analysis, there are several prominent group interaction datasets [103, 102],
possibly the most widely used is ELEA [130]. But most of the works in this area still
make predictions based on single subject’s data.
This dissertation aims to address these shortcomings by proposing ways of exploiting
the network nature of social interactions and showing that this leads to improvement on some of the challenging tasks, such as deception detection and impression
prediction.

1.2

Problem Statement

Given videos of people participating in social interaction (playing a game or making
public statements), we want to predict hidden properties of a given person’s behavior:
whether the person is deceptive or what is the person’s attitude towards other group
members.
These problems received significant attention from the research community. Figure 1.1 shows a generic solution pipeline that usually includes the following steps: (1)
separating modalities from the video of the subject, (2) extracting features from the
corresponding modalities, for instance, MFCC for audio or LIWC word frequencies
for text, (3) training a Machine Learning model to make a prediction for the classification task at hand. Different modalities are fused either before the model training step
(usually by concatenating, but sometimes using more sophisticated techniques [105])
or after the model training step (by means of late fusion [10]).
The scope of this dissertation is to explore different ways of using the group na3
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Proposed approaches
Network extraction

Interaction features

ML Model

Visual

ML Model

Acoustic/Prosodic

Ensemble

Final
prediction

Textual
I’m telling the truth, trust me!

Raw video data

Individual modalities signals

Extracting
unimodal features

Individual
feature
predictions

Existing approaches

Figure 1.1: Scope of the dissertation. The majority of automated social behavior
analysis works are considering each individual in the group, extracting some relevant
features and making predictions about traits or actions in question. We propose to
exploit the social nature of the interactions and produce features and models that
take mutual influence into account.
ture of the interactions (Figure 1.1). We propose ways of building features that use
group-level information for each considered task and show how that affects the final
prediction accuracy. We consider the following three tasks: deception detection in
group settings, deception detection in public statements, dyadic impression prediction.

1.3

Contributions

The overall contributions of this work can be summarised as follows:
• we proposed a way to exploit the group information for the task of long-term
deception detection,
• we showed how to build a network for the seemingly individual task of deception
detection in political and public statements and showed how we could use it to
improve the performance on this task,
• to evaluate our approach on the previous task, we collected a multimodal dataset
of deceptive and truthful statements by public figures,
4
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• finally, we developed several new features and a multi-layer network approach
to solve the task of dyadic impression prediction.
We briefly summarize each of these contributions below. And the rest of the document is organized as follows: in Chapter 2 we review existing work on the problems
in this dissertation and highlight where we stand out; Chapter 3 discusses the problem of long-term deception detection and how using group information can improve
the detection accuracy; Chapter 4 considers the task of political deception detection
and proposes a network-based solution that improves on other multi- and uni-modal
features; in Chapter 5 we try predicting dyadic impressions in a group setting by incorporating mutual influence in the group into the set of novel features as well as using
a multi-layer network to train a Graph Convolutional Network; finally, in Chapter 6
we provide concluding remarks and suggest potential extensions to our work.

1.3.1

Long-term deception detection (Chapter 3)

In this chapter, we consider a task of deception detection in long group interaction
videos. We use a novel Resistance dataset [45] containing videos of groups of subjects
playing a social game involving deception (see Section 2.3). This task brings several
challenges:
• Unlike most of the other datasets and works on the topic of deception detection,
which consider subjects in a monologue or interview setting, we deal with a
highly interactive setting. This causes several issues. For example, processing
the audio becomes complicated due to multiple people speaking concurrently.
Subjects in videos can move a lot, look away from camera, chat with other
players, or gesture. On one hand these features provide valuable information
about the subject’s state of mind, on the other hand these same features make
it harder to automatically analyze the videos.
• Unlike most of the other similar datasets, which contain short videos of 10–
120 seconds, the Resistance dataset contains very long videos spanning 30–60
minutes.
This chapter proposes a computational method that we call LiarOrNot to predict
deception in the game.

5
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In addition to the fact that long-term deception in group settings has been rarely
studied, LiarOrNot makes the following innovations. Building on well-known basic
image (VGG Face) and audio features (mel-frequency cepstral coefficients),
1. we introduce a class of histogram-based features that build on well known lowlevel (eye/head movement, facial action units) and high-level (emotion features
from Amazon Rekognition) features,
2. we introduce a novel class of “meta-features” called LiarRank that builds on the
basic features, and
3. we introduce an ensemble based prediction model.
We show that LiarOrNot achieves an AUC of 0.705 in this hard test, significantly
outperforming other feature classes and past work. Additionally, as the Resistance
dataset was collected across three very different countries and because there may be
cultural differences in deception, our results are more robust across cultures than past
studies.

1.3.2

Political deception detection (Chapter 4)

This chapter deals with the following problem: having a video of a public figure
(usually a politician) making a statement, we want to predict whether the statement
is truthful or deceptive. Similar to other works [84, 76] we use fact-checking of the
underlying fact as a proxy for the veracity of the statement: we consider it truthful
if fact-checkers found it to be factually correct and deceptive otherwise.
This task has its challenges:
• First, there is an obvious lack of publicly available datasets for this task: the
sole available dataset [100] contains only text and restricts itself to only US
politicians,
• Second, it is obvious that the veracity of the statement highly depends on the
content of that statement. Still, it is not immediately clear how to analyze the
content in the broader context.
In an attempt to overcome these challenges, we make the following novel contributions:
6
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1. We collect a new cross-cultural, multilingual dataset of public figures from several countries worldwide making truthful and deceptive statements. We call
this dataset the Global Political Deception Dataset. It is the first multimodal
dataset of this kind with subjects drawn from a variety of cultures and linguistic backgrounds;
2. We propose a way to build a graph with nodes representing videos of politicians,
topics of the messages, and news articles about those politicians: this method
allows putting the content of the analyzed statement into a broader context and
assess how likely it is to be deceptive;
3. We develop a novel class of features we call Deception Score that brings together
properties of the video (how likely the person in it to be deceptive) with the
assessment of how likely the message from the video to be deceptive;
4. We show that our proposed Deception Score in conjunction with basic features
greatly improve upon basic features alone and a comprehensive set of baselines.

1.3.3

Dyadic impression prediction (Chapter 5)

In this chapter, we consider the problem of dyadic impression prediction: given videos
showing group interaction, we want to predict whether subject pi likes or dislikes
subject pj . Specifically, we would like to use nonverbal cues such as facial action
units [12], facial emotions [89], gaze relationships [11], and more in order to predict
subject pi ’s impression about subject pj ’s likability. We capture likability through six
survey questions designed to elicit pi ’s impression of pj .
In order to predict these six types of dyadic impressions, we have developed a framework called DIPS (Dyadic Impression Prediction System). DIPS involves the following
features:
1. Emotion Ranks is a novel class of features intended to capture interpersonal
emotional response throughout the video. It is well-known (e.g. [36]) in social
science that the emotions of a subject pi about a subject pj may be influenced
by the emotions of others toward pj . We first consider emotions of a pair (pi , pj )
and define emotion score as the intensity of a given emotion on pi ’s face weighted
by the probability that that emotion is directed toward pj . Emotion rank takes
these dyadic emotion scores as input and uses interaction networks to account
7
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for the fact that user pi ’s impression of pj might depend not only on his facial
emotions, but also that of others, as well as his attitude toward those other
individuals. This leads to a mutual influence of emotions and network interactions that we aggregate. Past work on predicting impressions [98] only considers
direct gaze relationships and does not consider such network interactions.
2. Sign Imbalance features. Classical social network theory has identified the importance of triangles in friend/enemy networks. Such networks are called signed
networks [43, 50] in which edges can be positive or negative. Balance theory
forms an important part of social network theory going back to the time of Heider in the 1950s [66]. It suggests that for a triad to be balanced, the products of
any pair of edge weights must be positive. Important phenomena explained by
balance theory include the ideas that “a friend of my friend is my friend” and
“an enemy of my enemy is my friend”. In this thesis we propose a novel class of
features that measures the degree of imbalance thereby quantifying the effect of
a third party pk on the impression that pi has of pj . To our knowledge, this is
the first time that social balance theory has been used for predicting impressions
from nonverbal data.
3. Emotion and Facial Action Units Alignment. Social science theory [36] posits
that pi ’s impression of pj and pj ’s impression of pi are not independent. We can
observe this in our daily lives - if a person doesn’t like you that might cause
an unconscious response: you may not like them back. We might therefore get
clues about pi ’s impression of pj by looking at pj ’s facial emotions. We define
a novel class of alignment vectors that capture the alignment — with possible
temporal delays in order to account for subjects’ response times — between the
facial emotions and action units of subjects pi and pj .
4. Finally, we introduce the novel concept of a Temporal Delayed Network which
is a multi-layer network [37, 83] where each layer represents the social group at
a particular time point. Within a single layer, nodes correspond to players and
edges correspond to different interactions between players (e.g. look at, talk to,
listen to). Within a layer, edges are labeled with the probability of the stated
interaction. Across layers, edges connect the same individuals in different layers,
as well as track delayed interaction information. To our knowledge, this is the
first time that multi-layer networks have been used in predicting impressions of
subjects. Using this TDN as an underlying graph, we build a Graph Convolution
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Network [82] with an attention mechanisms [148] to learn representations and
predict dyadic impressions of pi toward pj .
We also build an ensemble model out of our proposed features. We evaluate our
framework on the Resistance dataset and show that it outperforms baselines that use
only single-subject features by a significant margin on all of the variables.
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2.1
2.1.1

Automated Deception Detection
Psychological and physiological research

Humans noticed that an act of lying brings some changes to a liar’s physiology.
Ford [57] records an ancient Chinese technique of making a suspect put dry rice in
the mouth and then spit it out. If the rice was still dry, the person was presumed to lie,
as the feeling of guilt was associated with lack of salivating. One of the first systematic
attempts at detecting lies was based on understanding human physiology and finding
correlations with psychophysiological effects of lying [1]. Physiological measurementbased methods measure blood pressure, heart/respiratory rate, and galvanic skin
response to detect deception. Other methods include blood flow measurements [23]
or brain imaging using fMRI [70]. Results showing that deception is linked to an increase in blood flow in the eye [2] which in turn can be detected via thermal imaging,
have led to new methods to identify deception in airports [113, 156, 71, 123]. When
Rajoub et al. [123] performed experiments with thermal videos, the method was very
successful (87% accuracy), but the same identity was part of the training and test set.
However, when different identities were evaluated, the performance dropped to 60%,
highlighting that deception detection on new identities is difficult. Moreover, this
experimental study was done on a small scale in short videos and only involved 25
people. In contrast, our approach focuses on deception prediction in people never seen
before and is evaluated on a dataset that is an order of magnitude larger. Improved
results are obtained when cues such as facial expressions, subtle body movements,
hesitations or pauses in speech, gaze aversion, dilation of pupils are combined with
physiological features [2]. Samuel et al. [129] used electromyography (EMG) readings
of the masseter muscle, along with electrocardiography and galvanic skin response, to
detect deceptive behavior with relative success. Prior work also shows that there is a
correlation of deception with emotions like fear, guilt, and delight [151]. The hypoth10
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esis is that significant cognitive load leads to subtle changes in some of these cues,
which can help in deception analysis [24, 40]. Compared to our proposed method,
these methods are not automatic, and the cues are typically annotated by humans,
which are later used in a classifier.
Burgoon et al. [26] demonstrated that deceitful and truthful speech could be detected
based on linguistic cues, deceivers being more concise, having less rich language and
less complex sentence structures, demonstrating lack of specificity. Zhou et al. [170]
performed analysis of emails and found that deceivers’ and truth tellers’ linguistic
patterns differ, and deceivers’ language changes over time to adapt to the changing
interaction.

2.1.2

Deception detection datasets

Several unimodal datasets for deception detection were developed over the past ten
years. Cross-Cultural Deception dataset [116] contains a set of essays on controversial
topics written by subjects from four countries with different culture: US, India, Mexico, and Romania. Subjects were required to write short essays not necessarily representing their own belief on the given topic. Open Domain Deception Dataset [117]
also relied on crowd-sourcing: subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk were requested
to provide several casual truths and lies in the form of one sentence. This dataset also
contains the demographic data about the subjects. Another dataset [146] contains
Electroencephalogram (EEG) readings of subjects when they lie or tell the truth.
Mihalcea et al. [96] collected a dataset of short answers to three promts written by
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers: 100 truthful and 100 deceptive statements on each
of the three topics. Nasril et al.[101] created a ReGIM-Lab Lie Detection DataBase
where subjects participated in an interview and the answers (truthful and deceitful)
were recorded. Zhang et al. [168] were among first to use fine-grained image analysis
to detect deception in facial and emotional expressions in static images. To distinguish genuine facial expressions from simulated ones, they proposed a set of features
relying on 58 manually labeled facial points, which makes the approach not fully
automated.
Several more datasets contain two or more modalities: usually speech and text, but
sometimes also video or physiological readings (EEG, ECG, etc.) Levitan et al.
collected a Columbia X-Cultural Deception (CXD) Corpus of dialogs where subjects
were lying or telling the truth about some casual topics [88]. This corpus explores
11
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acoustic, prosodic, and linguistic sides of the deception. Early work in the computer
vision community used head and hand tracking to predict the state of the human
subject in a video (relaxed, agitated or over-controlled) to infer whether a person is
deceitful [136, 143]. These methods, however, were tested on a very small database
(5 videos with a total duration of 5 minutes 33 seconds), were person-specific and
prone to overfitting. Michael et al. [95] proposed a feature called motion patterns,
incorporating both head/hand movement and automatic facial landmarks tracking.
One of the most widely used datasets is a Real-Life Trial dataset [122] that contains
videos of people telling truths or lying in a high stake situation: testifying in a court
of law. This dataset comprises videos, transcripts, and manually annotated facial
expressions. Two research groups attempted to create a low-stake lies dataset by using
the “Box of Lies” game: one player describes an object in the box that only she can
see, and another player must guess whether the first player is telling the truth or lying.
Soldner et al. [52] used publicly available recordings of the “Box of Lies” game played
by United States celebrities on The Tonight Show with Jimmy Fallon. This dataset
contains videos of the players annotated for deception at utterance level, since the
deceptive description of an object can be false in only minor details (for example, the
player can change the color of the object leaving all other details truthful). Another
similar dataset called “Bag of Lies” [63] contains video, audio, and eye gaze of subjects
playing the same game in laboratory settings. For a subset of subjects EEG readings
are also available.
In the recent years several datasets emerged for deception detection in group setting.
All of them are based on a variances of a social game “Mafia” (other versions are
“Werewolf” and “The Resistance”). In these games some players form a secret clique
aiming at deceiving the rest of the players and staying hidden to win the game. Some
of these datasets are formed out of publicly available videos of a TV-game with the
same name [39], others conducted the games in controlled setting and recorded the
videos [31, 45]. The Resistance dataset [45] also includes a set of surveys quantifying
players feelings towards each other. Two other datasets contain transcripts of a
similar game played online through text-messaging service [162] or on the online
message board [38].
Apart from high stake lies (courtroom testimonies) and low stake lies (games and
mock interviews), another domain of interest for automated deception detection is
politics. It has been shown that the false news are spreading much faster and reach
larger audience than truthful news [150]. Thus it is becoming important to be able to
12
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automatically assess the truthfulness of the statements made by public figures such
as politicians and high-level government officials.
One dataset aiming at this task is CT-CWC-18 corpus used in CLEF-2018 CheckThat!
Lab Task [100]. It contains transcripts of political debates from 2016 US Presidential
campaign alongside with labels of truthfulness according to fact-checking resources1 .
Another dataset [76] contains 180 videos of US politicians from both major parties
making public statements that are labeled by PolitiFact2 with one of the following
verdicts: True, Mostly True, Half True, Mostly False, False, Pants on Fire. This
dataset, although truly multimodal, is not publicly available at the moment of writing
this thesis.
In this work we wish to contribute to the field by introducing a new dataset that we
call Global Political Deception Dataset containing videos of public figures from around
the world making truthful or false statements. We selected the subjects from a wide
array of countries and cultures.

2.1.3

Deception detection methods

Since the first available deception detection datasets were mostly unimodal (usually
text or audio), early work in this area was mostly concentrated on these modalities.
Hirschberg et al. [67] used lexical (LIWC categories) and acoustic/prosodic features to
distinguish deceptive speech from truthful. Mihalcea et al. [96] used similar linguistic
features, in particular LIWC 2001 categories frequencies to detect deceptive language
in texts. Nasril et al. [101] proposed an audio-only approach analyzing pitch and
MFCC features of the subjects’ voice. Fernandes at al. [54] suggested using spectral
and cepstral features of speech signals to detect deception.
The release of the Real-Life Trial dataset [122] prompted more research groups to look
into multi-modal deception detection. The dataset authors [134] used a set of features
from each modality: unigrams and LIWC categories frequency for lingustic features,
manually annotated facial expressions and hand gestures, automatically extracted Facial Action Units, as well as pitch and silence/speech histograms for acoustic features.
Same group later extended this work to include thermal imaging data (by collecting
the relevant dataset) [3]. Wu et al. [158] used multi-modal approach: visual, acoustic,
textual features as well as facial expression annotations to build an ensemble models
1
2

https://www.factcheck.org/
https://www.politifact.com/
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to detect deception in the Real-Life Trial dataset. Similar general approach but different uni-modal features were used by Rill-Garcia et al. [128] to detect deception in
the Real-Life Trial dataset and the Spanish Language Abortion/Best Friend datasets.
Several works made an attempt at using Deep Learning for the task of deception detection [138, 60, 78, 42] with the latter proposing an adversarial learning technique
to overcome scarcity of data in the Real-Life Trial dataset.
Several works considered deceptive behavior in group settings. Yu et al. [162] used
sentiment analysis to infer players’ attitude towards each other and to build a network
to identify a group of deceitful players. Other works dealing with deception in group
setting only use player-level features such as linguistic and lexical patterns [38], facial
expressions [39, 138], and speech patterns [31]. The latter exploits some rudimentary
group-level information by including such features as the number of successful interruptions, number of turns during the discussion, and others. Wang et al. [152] used
an attention mechanism to further analyze the deceptive facial behaviors. Kumar et
al. [86, 155] exploited the social interaction networks extracted from the Resistance
dataset to identify deceivers.
In this thesis (Chapter 3) we consider very long videos to detect deceptive behavior.
We use visual and audio features such as Facial Action Units, Emotion expressions,
Head/Eye Movement, VGG Face embeddings, and MFCC to predict long-term deception in a group setting on the Resistance dataset [45]. We also propose a LiarRank
meta-feature to exploit group nature of the interaction.
Since the politics and public relations are a natural source of deceitful speech, some
researchers directed their interests to this direction. Clementson [34] analyzed how
well humans are able to detect lies and truths in political debates and found that
humans are significantly truth-biased on average (presume truth by default) but also
have high levels of partisan bias (more often think that politicians from an opposing
party lie). Another study [33, 32] found that humans are relatively good at detecting when politicians dodge the questions, which negatively affects trustworthiness of
the politician in the eyes of viewers, but this effect also highly depends on political
attitudes of the viewer.
Kamboj et al. [76] uses several sets of features from multiple modalities (visual:
Facial Expressions, Pose, gaze; linguistic: Glove represenataions, LIWC categories
frequency, polarity of statements, POS tagging, unigram; acoustic: OpenSMILE features for emotions predictions) as well as their combinations. The authors test their
approach on the dataset of US politicians statements. Kopev et al. [84] attempts
14
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at detecting false statements in US Presidential debates. The authors exploit both
audio and textual modalities of the data: they use BERT [41] embeddings, TF-IDF
vectors [72], and LIWC categories frequencies for the text, and OpenSMILE feaures
for acoustic analysis. Windsor et al. [157] considers a very specific case of a political
speech: Bill Clinton’s testimonies and speeches related to his impeachment process.
The authors explored how syntactic (using Coh-Metrix linguistic analysis tool), sentiment (using LIWC dictionary), acoustic (using OpenSMILE and openEAR tools
for audio analysis), facial expressions (using iMotions biometric platform), and fusion
of the unimodal features affect the deception prediction and which of them provide
reliable cues to the deception.
These works only examine each individual politician at the moment of making the
statement in question and analyze the behavior of that politician as well as the linguistic properties of the statement. We propose to consider the content of the statement
in the broader context: what this politician is talking about, how controversial is the
topic, and how likely that politician is to lie on that topic.

2.2
2.2.1

Impression Prediction
Social and psychological science efforts

Since the late last century, social and psychology scientists have been studying dyadic
and group impressions between individuals.
In general, positive and negative impressions can be discovered from observing personality traits. Reysen [126] developed a likeability scale asking subjects to rate
other people on 11 variables, such as attractiveness, friendliness, similarity to a subject, likeliness to be a friend with a subject. He also observed that genuine laughter
is a strong predictor of likeability [126, 127]. One of the most intensely researched
personality trait groups are The Big Five [61]: a group of five factors that can be
repeatably recognized in various sample data, including extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culture.
Researchers have also looked into cause and effects interactions that result in the
liking or disliking of another. Davydenko et al. [36] observed that the way people act
(e.g. extroverted or introverted) affects how other participants judge them, as well as
serve as a part of the feedback loop: a person interacting with an extroverted acting
15
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partner is perceived as nicer and displaying more positive social behavior.
Seiter et al. [133] showed that even background nonverbal behavior can alter the
impression of a person. In an experiment where one debater non-verbally expresses
her agreement or disagreement with another speaking debater, Seiter shows that the
nonspeaking debater is perceived as less likable if she expresses moderate or constant
disagreement compared to a neutral expression.
According to Floyd and Burgoon [56], nonverbal expressions, such as smiling or gaze
attention, can be more provocative than verbal expressions. The experiments conducted showed that the specific combination of gaze attention and smiling is the most
impactful combination to the receiver of said expressions compared to other possible
combinations.
Besides nonverbal actions and behavior, Hareli et al. [64] showed that knowledge
about the emotional response of a person can be used by people in forming impressions of that person. In other words, they discovered that people associate personality
impressions with emotional reactions. This “reverse engineering” of a situation creates outcomes such as deeming someone negatively when he or she is angry in an
unpleasant situation.
One important theory espoused by various social scientists about the concern of
recognizing an individual’s impression of another is the Interpersonal Adaptation
Theory (IAT), which can be considered to be a summation of impression theories [27].
The theory states that people have preset expectations when interacting with others.
The individual’s behavior can thus be predicted if these conditions are met or not
met. For instance, if Person B seems aggressive to Person A when Person A expected
nothing of the sort, then it can be predicted by IAT that Person A will have a negative
impression of B.
Besides creating prediction theories over impression detection, social scientists have
also analyzed sentiment change over time among strangers. Bruce and McDonald [22]
suggest that a person will continue to like a stranger if there was an initial positive
reaction. Interestingly enough, an initial negative reaction does not lead to one disliking another for long periods of time. Instead, people tend to forget unlikable faces,
and thus the possibility of an impression change from dislike to like appears to be
higher than constant displeasure. This finding also reflects in the data used for this
thesis.
To detect the change from dislike to like in individuals, various features were built
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to reflect social science theories. We also look at group dynamics for insight. For
instance, Nisbett [104] finds that sentiment is correlated with the subject’s popularity
in the group. In other words, even if someone has a negative initial opinion of another
person, that person’s popularity can decrease the negative sentiment from the former.
Another important quality of human interaction is rapport. Tickle-Degnen and
Rosenthal [141] identify three essential components of rapport: mutual attentiveness,
positivity, and coordination between participants. Rapport, in Tickle-Degnen and
Rosenthal’s terms, means mutual responsiveness between individuals. Specifically,
nonverbal behavior is seen as a quintessential component of identifying rapport. During a helpful context, a person mirroring another person has a strong correlation for
mutual positive attitudes of each other. While context is important in weighing each
of the three components, it should be recognized that all are necessary for positive
liking to take place. Furthermore, if there is a positive relationship between two individuals, social science research suggests a certain amount of facial mimicry occurs.
Murata [99] suggests, for instance, that people will emulate someone’s grin if they
like that person: smiling means more smiling. Overall, it would seem a person’s gaze
or attention drives this mimicry. It is also noted by Murata [99] that disliked people
are mimicked less.
From the research published by social scientists, we decided to narrow our scopes
for the sake of practicality. Our research is focused more on individuals forming
negative impressions because previous social science research suggests that negativity
is far easier to identify than its opposite. Floyd et al. [56] supports this reasoning by
mentioning that people’s expression of dislike is more “uncontrollable” and external
while acceptance is generally internally expressed and more controlled in gesture.

2.2.2

Computational efforts

Over the past decade, there was also an increasing interest in automated analysis
and modeling of human-to-human interaction in dyadic or group settings as well as
computer-mediated interactions.
Several datasets were proposed as benchmarks for a variety of human interaction related tasks. SEMAINE [93] and its modifications contain videos of people conversing
with human-driven, semi-automatic, and automatic virtual agents, and annotations
of perceived personality traits. ELEA [130] captures collaborative group interaction,
the Big Five traits, and leadership behavior annotated by external observers as well
17
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as perceived leadership and likeness reported by group participants. MATRICS [103]
uses several modalities (motion capture, gaze tracking, head acceleration, video, audio, Kinect sensor) to record a small group of people participating in a task-oriented
discussion. ChaLearn First Impressions dataset [120] comprises a set of YouTube
videos with human-annotated the Big Five scores. VLOG [18] is another dataset
of YouTube videos with crowdsourced personality impressions. In addition to that,
several datasets were published with a focus on job interviews and hireability prediction [69, 102].
The majority of the work in this area is focused on predicting apparent personality
traits, the most common ones are the Big Five and leadership style, which is partly
due to the availability of the relevant data. Joshi et al. [74] used Pyramid of Histogram of Gradient to predict perceived traits in videos of humans interacting with
virtual agents expressing various personalities. Chávez-Martı́nez et al. [30] use multimodal features for multi-label prediction of moods and traits in the VLOG dataset
exploiting high correlations between moods and perceived traits. Sheng et al. [51]
used a variety of semantic visual and audio features as well as dyadic and group
features for personality traits prediction in small groups and provided some insights
on the importance of those features for predicting particular traits. Çeliktutan et
al. [172, 173] used visual features such as Histogram of Gradients and Histogram of
Optical Flow as well as audio features such as MFCC to predict perceived traits in
videos of humans interacting with virtual agents. Kindiroglu et al. [81] used multitask and transfer learning for extraversion and leadership prediction on ELEA and
VLOG datasets with the same set of high-level audio-visual features. Kampman et
al. [77] proposed an end-to-end deep model for multimodal impression prediction.
Beyan et al. [16] used DNN based features for leadership and high/low extraversion
prediction. In other work [17] they used dynamic images and activity-based information for personality traits inference. Mawalim et al. [92] investigated the effectiveness
of multimodal features such as acoustic, head motion, and linguistic features for the
personality traits prediction. Anselmi et al. [4] used deep neural networks to infer
self-reported personality traits from highly constrained still face images. Zhang et
al. [164] proposed an end-to-end deep neural network for joint prediction of apparent
personality and emotions, showing that joint task improves upon separate traits or
emotions prediction. Muller et al. [98] proposed a framework for detecting low rapport in a small group setting using speech, facial, and body movement features. Bai
et al. [10] suggested a framework for detecting the most dominant person in a group
and relative dominance between two people by exploiting interaction dynamics within
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the group. Okada et al. [107] proposed co-occurrence pattern mining in multimodal
features such as speech, head movement, body movement, and gaze for leadership and
the Big Five prediction. Zhang et al. [165] also considered co-occurring visual events
for the Big Five traits predictions. Recently some efforts also went into explainability
and interpretability of the impression predicting systems [48].
Some research focused on assessing communication skills in group setting [108, 103].
Lin et al. [90] built a conversational Graph Convolutional Network from participant
acoustic and lexical features to predict group performance outcomes in the ELEA
dataset. Eloy et al. [47] used face and upper movement multi-dimensional recurrence
quantification analysis to model team level dynamics and predict the collaborative
outcome.
One of the motivations for modeling human personality and interpersonal communication is building better devices aimed at assisting humans. Zhang et al. [167]
explored the way of assessing personal affect and team cohesion in small groups using
wearable devices capable of recording data about movement, face-to-face interaction,
location, and audio communication.
Our work differs from previous research in several key aspects. First, we predict
dyadic impressions as opposed to group impressions. In other words, we predict how
humans in the group perceive each other, and not how the group as a whole perceives
a person, or how a group of external observers perceives that person. Second, we
actively employ the group interaction nature of our dataset and propose a set of
features and a multi-layer network model aimed at capturing social dynamics.

2.3

The Resistance dataset

Our collaborators designed and collected the new Resistance dataset [45] based on
the social role-playing, card-based party game The Resistance (some variations of the
game are also known as Mafia or Werewolf). In this section, we will describe the
nature of the game and the dataset based on it.

2.3.1

Game description.

Figure 2.1 outlines the process of the game as it was conducted during the data
collection. At the beginning of each session, the facilitator of the game introduces
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Ice-breaker
Round
Practice Round

Mission Leader
nomination
Failure

Pre-game Survey
Mission Leader
approval

Roles assigned
Round 1

Success
Mission Team
nomination

Game

Round 2

Failure
1–2 times
In-game Survey

Mission Team
approval
Success

Round N

Post-game activities

Mission

Failure
3 times

Game results

Round results
Post-game survey

Debriefing

Figure 2.1: The Resistance game process. The game session starts with pre-game
warm-up activities, proceeds to the game consisting of several rounds, and ends with a
post-game period. Each round goes through several steps: mission leader nomination
and election, mission team nomination and approval, the mission itself.
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Number of players

5

6

7

8

Number of spies
Number of villagers

2 2 3 3
3 4 4 5

Table 2.1: Rules of the Resistance game: number of spies depending on the total
number of the players
themselves and invites the participants to introduce themselves as well. This interaction serves as an ice-breaker activity and allows players to get to know each other
better before the game starts. Each participant is asked to state her name, her major,
and one interesting thing about herself. After that, a participant sitting across the
newly introduced participant has to ask her a follow-up question.
After all players introduced themselves, the facilitator explains the rules of the Resistance game, and participants play one practice round, which is identical to the first
round of the actual game, except all votes, including mission vote, are public. The
practice round is intended to ensure the players understand the rules of the game.
Number of players
5
6
7
8

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

R6

R7

R8

2
3
3
3

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4

3
4
5
5

3
5
4
5

5
4
5

5
4
5

Table 2.2: Rules of the Resistance game: number of players on a mission in every
round depending on the number of players in the game
Number of players
5
6
7
8

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

R6

R7

R8

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

2
1
2
2

1
1
2
2

1
2
2
2

2
2
2

2
2
2

Table 2.3: Rules of the Resistance game: number of failure votes required to fail the
mission in every round depending on the number of players in the game
After the practice round, the players are asked to fill in a survey (Table 2.5). When
all participants complete the pre-game survey, the game starts, and each player is
randomly assigned a role: a “villager” or a “spy”. The number of spies in the game
depends on the total number of players in that game (Table 2.1). Spies are also
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secretly informed about who other spies are. Villagers are only aware of their own
role.
Then, the game proceeds in rounds (every round is called a “mission”). Each round
consists of the following steps:
1. First, players nominate and discuss a mission leader among themselves. Each
round, a mission leader has to change so that no player can be a mission leader
in two consecutive rounds.
2. Then, players vote to approve or reject the nominated leader. The vote happens
secretly (using tablets in front of the players) and then publicly (by raising
hands), but only secret votes count towards the game. If the nominee obtains a
majority of votes, she is approved, and the game proceeds to the next step. If
the nominee fails to secure the majority of votes, her nomination fails, and the
Step 1 starts again. These steps repeat until someone receives the majority of
player votes. Each time the game facilitator announces the secret ballot results
(number of votes for approval and against it) without specifying individual
players’ votes.
3. Then, the elected mission leader nominates several players for the mission. The
number of players to go on a mission is announced before each round. It depends
on the total number of players in the game and the round number (see Table 2.2).
4. After a discussion, all players vote to approve or reject the proposed mission
team. As in Step 2, players vote secretly and publicly, but only secret vote
counts. If the nominated team receives the support of the majority, then it is
approved, and the round proceeds to the mission. If the team cannot obtain the
majority of votes, it is rejected. In this case, the mission leader has to nominate
another group of players, and steps 3–4 repeat. If nominated teams get rejected
three times, the round ends with the point going to the spies. As in step 2, the
game facilitator announces the final vote toll without detailing individual votes.
5. Finally, the approved mission team “goes on a mission”: each member of the
mission team secretly votes to succeed or fail the mission. The number of fail
votes necessary to fail the mission is announced at the beginning of the round
and depends on the round and the number of players in the game (Table 2.3).
The game facilitator announces vote toll. If the necessary number of “fail”
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votes is achieved, the mission fails, and the spies get the point for the round.
Otherwise mission is successful, and villagers get the point.
The game lasts for 4–8 rounds and is limited by the total session time. If spies and
villagers have equal scores by the end of the allotted time, the facilitator runs a breaking round. The team with the highest score at the end of the game wins and receives
additional monetary incentives after the game. Moreover, elected mission leaders
also receive a financial reward which incentivizes players to nominate themselves as
leaders during the rounds.
After every even-numbered round, the players fill in an in-game survey (Table 2.5).
After the last round and the announcement of the results of the game, all players are
asked to complete a post-game survey (Table 2.5). In order to keep answers unbiased,
the players are prohibited from sharing their roles with others until they leave the
room. Finally, all participants are debriefed about the goals and details of the study.
By the nature of the game, spies and villagers have different incentives throughout
the process. Spies want to stay stealthy as long as possible and get elected on as
many missions as possible to fail them and earn points for the team. Villagers want
to collectively identify spies as early as possible to prevent them from getting on the
missions. Thus, this game has both a collaborative and adversary nature.

2.3.2

Dataset description.

The Resistance dataset contains data from 95 games with a total of 697 players.
These games were conducted under IRB authorization at eight geographical locations
Country

University

UCSB
USA
University of Arizona
University of Maryland
Zambia
The University of Zambia
Hong Kong Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Singapore
Nanyang Technological University
Israel
Tel Aviv University
Fiji
University of the South Pacific

# of games

# of players

11
9
10
15
15
12
9
14

78
61
70
117
115
84
64
108

Table 2.4: The Resistance data geographical distribution.

23

CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
49

Number of games

50

38

40

40

30
31

23

30
20

15

20
13

10

10

10

6
3

2
0

0
5
6
7
8
Number of players in a game

3
4
5
6
7
8
Number of rounds in a game

Figure 2.2: The Resistance game players and rounds distribution.
spanning different continents and cultures (Table 2.4). Most of the participants were
recruited among college students through college message boards. The average age
of the players is 22.4 with the youngest participant to be 16 and the oldest to be
48. Gender distribution is the following: 47.2% of players were male, and 52.8% were
female. Participants reported various ethnicities, with the most popular being Asian
(39.2%) and White (18.2%).
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of games with respect to the number of players and
the number of rounds: most of the games lasted for 5–6 rounds and had 7–8 players.
The average duration of a game was 46 minutes, with lengths varying from 29 minutes
to 66 minutes.
The Resistance dataset comprises video footage of the game sessions, information on
the game progress, and survey results filled by the players. Figure 2.3 shows how
several cameras capture every game. Frontal video of every player is recorded with
tablet cameras in front of the player. The 360-degree camera records the video of
all players at once. One or more overhead cameras record the overall view of the
room where the game is conducted. For this research, we only use the high-definition
quality frontal videos recorded on the tablet cameras (Figure 2.3a). These videos
were recorded with 29.98 fps frame-rate, 1920 × 1080 resolution, and 16 : 9 aspect
ratio.
In addition to audio-visual data from the cameras, the dataset also includes surveys
that players fill in before the game (pre-game survey), after the game (post-game survey), and after every two rounds of the game (in-game survey) as shown in Table 2.5.
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Pre-game survey records the basic sociological data about the player (age, sex, ethnicity, major, native language and the county of origin, level of English language
fluency, and others), psychological questionnaire (questions related to the Big Five
traits, questions intended to quantify player’s cultural background), questions about
player’s perception of other players (trust, dominance, likeability, nervousness). In
the in-game surveys, players score each other on a number of traits: how dominant
each player is, how nervous or anxious each player looks, how much the player trusts
other players, and who the player thinks spies might be. Post-game surveys contain
more fine-grained questions about the same traits. For example, for likeability trait,
the survey asks to rate each player on being cold vs. warm, friendly vs. unfriendly,
etc.; for trust, the players need to rate each player on being useful vs. useless, honest
vs. dishonest, deceptive vs. truthful, etc. The post-game survey also asks gamerelated questions (e.g. whether the player was engaged or bored, whether the other
players were engaged and how they behaved) and introspective questions (e.g. how
often the player lied, which non-verbal clues the player used to identify liars, how the
game made the player feel).

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.3: Setup of the game. Players sit in a circle. In front of each player, there is
a tablet with a camera (a). There are also one or more overhead cameras (b) and a
360-degree camera (c).
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Question type

Pre-game

In-game

Post-game

Sociological questions: age, sex, ethnicity, college major, country of origin, etc.
Psychological survey: the Big Five, group vs.
individual, etc.
Personal qualities of other players: likeable,
friendly, etc.
Trust-related qualities of other players: trustworthy, honest, etc.
Dominance-related qualities of other players:
dominant, quiet, active, etc.
Nervousness-related qualities of other players:
nervous, anxious, tense, etc.
Suspected spies
Game-related questions: enjoyed the game, felt
engaged, etc.
Introspection questions: how often lied, how
the game made feel, etc.
Other players’ engagement: how interested,
how involved, etc.

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×
×
×
×

Table 2.5: Survey questions. Some questions only appear in pre- or post-game questionnaires. Some questions appear at all stages of the game but with different granularity: in-game survey asks for overall judgement of a quality while post-game survey
asks about specific manifestations separately.
Game information contains records of the player’s actions during the game: whether
the player was a spy or a villager, whether the player was elected a mission leader or
a mission team member in every round, and all player’s secret votes.
Because of the incremental data collection process, not all of the Resistance dataset
videos were available at the time of experiments for our projects. Actual numbers of
videos used for each of the tasks are specified in corresponding chapters (Chapters 3
and 5).
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Long-Term Deception Detection
Past work on automated deception in video [168, 122, 158] focuses on videos of a single
person in a short (15–200 second) clip. In this chapter, we present a fully automated
system (LiarOrNot) in which we take a frontal video of a subject interacting with a
group and predict whether that person is being deceptive in the long term, i.e. across
the duration of a 30–65 minute video. The Resistance game and its variants such
as Mafia and Werewolf naturally induce long term deception in a highly interactive
group setting. The Resistance game usually involves 5-8 players, 2-3 of whom are
designated “spies” who win the game if they are not discovered. Thus, they must be
deceptive throughout the game, but must intermix lies with truth in order to stay
undiscovered by others. We develop methods to predict “spies” and “honest” players
in the game as a proxy for the deception detection task.
In addition to the fact that long-term deception in group settings has been rarely
studied, LiarOrNot makes the following innovations. Building on well-known image
(VGG Face) and audio features (Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients),
(i) we introduce a class of histogram-based features that build on well known lowlevel (eye/head movement, facial action units) and high-level (emotion features
from Amazon Rekognition) features,
(ii) we introduce a novel class of “meta-features” called LiarRank that builds on the
basic features, and
(iii) we introduce an ensemble based prediction model.
Our 10-fold cross validations split the entire set of videos into training and testing sets
based on games. Hence, LiarOrNot predicts on games and people that are completely
disjoint from those seen in training. We show that LiarOrNot achieves an AUC of
0.705 in this hard test, significantly outperforming other feature classes and past
work. Additionally, as our data set was collected across three very different countries
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features BF of training games
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Figure 3.1: LiarOrNot Architecture. Steps: Uniformly sample n clips from a player’s
video, then (1) extract frame features, including VGG Face, emotions, facial action
units and eye/head movements, (2) aggregate frame features and sub-second MFCC
features to clip features, (3) and (4) aggregate previous features to player features,
(4) is histograms of low-dimension high-level features, and (3) is Fisher Vectors (FV),
(5) build LiarRank of player features. Finally, predictions made from each feature type
are used in our ensemble spy predictor to generate the final prediction.
and because there may be cultural differences in deception, our results are more robust
across cultures than past studies (though much additional work needs to be done to
capture African and Latin American cultures as well).

3.1

Methodology

Architecture. Figure 3.1 shows the LiarOrNot architecture. Let T G = {T G1 , . . . , T Gn }
be the set of training game videos (e.g. in some fold of cross validation) and let T Gn+1
be any game (either in T G or not). In any game T Gj , let pji be the i’th player in that
game. In our data, i varies from 1 through a max of 8. Each player pij ’s frontal camera
captures a video vji of that player of length 30–65 minutes. Each player appeared in
exactly one game. Since we wish to predict whether a player pij is deceptive or not,
each player needs to have an associated feature vector f v(pij ) which we define as either
a basic feature vector bf (pij ) or a LiarRank meta-feature vector sr(pij ).
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first explain the concept of
LiarRank, showing how to associate a LiarRank meta-feature vector sr(pij ) with player
pij . We then explain how the “basic” features are derived. Finally, we explain our
ensemble predictor. Throughout this section, we use the ”dot” notation to denote
the connection between representations and level of aggregation, e.g. f r.fi denotes
feature fi of the frame f r, and Cl.f denotes feature vector f of clip Cl.
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Algorithm 1: LiarRank(T G, T Gn+1 , p`n+1 , fh )
Input : Training set T G = {T G1 , . . . , T Gn }, Player p`n+1 from some game
T Gn+1 , basic feature fh
Output: srh (p`n+1 )
1
2
3
4
5
6

for j ∈ [1, . . . , n] do
S
V als(fh , j) = {p`n+1 .fh } ∪ 8i=1 {pij .fh }
Sort V als(fh , j) in descending order
rj = position of p`n+1 .fh ’s value in V als(fh , j)
end
return the vector hr1 , . . . , rn i

3.1.1

LiarRank Features

Suppose BF = {fh }kh=1 is any set of basic features. Given any basic feature fh , we
will first define the LiarRank srh (pij ) of player pij w.r.t. feature fh . The LiarRank
vector sr(pij ) is then the vector hsr1 (pij ), . . . , srk (pij )i obtained by concatenating these
individual feature-ranks.
The LiarRank algorithm shown above (Algorithm 1) takes as input, a training set
T G = {T G1 , . . . , T Gn }, a game T Gn+1 (which could be in T G or not), as well as a
player and a single feature fh . It returns a vector of length n (i.e. number of games
in the training set) which captures the position of players p`n+1 ’s value for feature
fh w.r.t. the corresponding values for other players in each of the n games. To do
this, it computes the value of the feature for the player p`n+1 as well as every player
who participated in any of the training games. The resulting set of features values is
stored in the set V als(fh ). This set of values is then sorted in descending order. The
first item in the descending order has position (or rank) 1, the second has position (or
rank) 2, etc. The LiarRank of player p`n+1 w.r.t. feature fh is its position in the sorted
V als(fh ) list. Intuitively, LiarRank of player p`n+1 w.r.t. feature fh is the relative rank
of player p`n+1 had she participated in that game.
The above defines the LiarRank vector of a player w.r.t. a feature. The LiarRank
vector of a player is the concatenation of the feature vectors. (further illustrated
in Figure 3.2). There is some similarity between LiarRank and the rank transform
proposed in [163] and the local binary pattern descriptor (LBP) in computer vision.
Example. We illustrate LiarRank via a simple example using Figure 3.2. In this
example, there are three games and we are considering feature f1 . The values of this
feature for the players in the games are shown in the three tables labeled T G1 , T G2 ,
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Figure 3.2: LiarRank meta-feature calculation process.
T G3 and that value of this feature for the player pln+1 is 0.3. As there are three base
features in this highly simplified example for each player, the LiarRank sr(pln+1 , f1 )
vector will be of length three. The rank of the first player w.r.t. the players in T G1
is r1 = 4 because the set V als(f1 , 1) after sorting is {0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1} and
pln+1 .f1 = 0.3 is the fourth entry in this list. When we consider the second game, the
set V als(f1 , 1) after sorting is {0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3} setting r2 = 5. In the same
way, r3 = 2. Thus the LiarRank vector for pln+1 w.r.t. f1 is <4, 5, 2>. Vectors of
length 3 each for features f2 , f3 are similarly calculated and concatenated to obtain
the final LiarRank vector for player pln+1 .

3.1.2

Basic Features

Sampling. We sample 10-second clips at an interval of 30 seconds per video. Since
games are 30-65 minutes long, different videos may consist of different numbers of
clips. From each clip, we further sample a set of m = 300 frames for Eye/Head Estimations and m = 20 frames for the rest of visual features (see below). As low/high-level
video features as well as audio features for each player may vary substantially over
the length of the video, we define features at both the frame-level and clip-level. For
each (ClipId, F rameId) pair, we extract a set of basic features.
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Basic Frame Features. Once frames are extracted, we extract the following basic
features:
• VGG Face [112] is a deep neural network pretrained on a large scale face
recognition dataset. To obtain VGG Face features, we first detect the player’s
face in the frame using OpenFace [12], then input the cropped rectangle containing the detected face to the VGG Face network and extract activations of
the fully connected layer (“fc6”). We expect these 4096-dimensional activation
vectors to contain high level information about faces. We perform PCA on these
representations to reduce dimensionality to 512.
• Facial Action Units (FAU). We use OpenFace [12] to predict the intensity
of 18 Facial Action Units [13, 46] on a 5-point scale. This software detects faces
and relevant points on them and then uses pre-trained deep neural models to
extract FAUs and their intensities.
• Eye/Head Estimations (EHEs). OpenFace is also used for estimating eye
gaze angle, head position and rotation. We calculate eye and head movement
features as a difference between key point coordinates of successive frames.
• Basic Expressions. Amazon Rekognition, a proprietary cloud-based service1
provides estimations of seven emotion intensities (happy, sad, angry, confused,
disgusted, surprised, calm) and three facial attributes (open eyes, open mouth,
smile) for a face in the frame. Each emotion and facial attribute feature is a
real value from 0 to 100. These seven emotions are widely considered as basic
in psychological literature [142, 29] and used as targets in automatic emotion
recognition models [53].
• Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [35] features are widely
used for speech recognition tasks. For each sampled audio clip, we use a sliding
window with a window-size of 25 ms and step size of 10 ms, then we get a series
of MFCC features corresponding to short intervals.

Basic Clip-level features. We aggregate frame-level features into clip-level features with average-pooling. If a clip Cl is a set of sampled frames, then the value
1
Σf r∈Cl f r.fh . Clip-level
of a clip-level feature fh for clip Cl is given by Cl.fh = |Cl|
1

https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/
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features smooth variations in frame level features, especially as those variations can
be substantial for some features, e.g. emotion features.

Player-level features. As the goal is to extract features at a per-player level, we
aggregate clip-level features into player-level features using Fisher Vectors (for VGG
Face representations), or histograms (for Facial Action Units, Eye/Head movement,
and Amazon Rekognition features).

Fisher Vector features. Fisher vector (FV) is a bag-of-words based model heavily
used for object recognition in images [118]. Note that each video may have a different
number of clips. Fisher Vectors aggregate the clip level features of an arbitrarily
long video into a fixed length encoding. It first builds a K-component GMM model
(µi , σi , wi : i = 1, 2, ..., K) from all the clip-level features in training data, where
µi , σi , wi are the mean vector, diagonal of a covariance matrix, and mixture weights
for the ith component, respectively. Given a player P l and clips that were extracted
for this player Clt ∈ P l, we first extract clip-level features {Cl1 .f , Cl2 .f , ..., Cl|P l| .f },
where Clt .f is a clip-level feature vector for the tth clip, and |P l| is the number of
clips for the player P l. It’s Fisher Vector is computed as:

Gµi

Gσi



|P l|
X
Clt .f − µi
1
γt (i)
=
√
|P l| wi t=1
σi



|P l|
X
1
(Clt .f − µi )2
√
−1
=
γt (i)
σi2
|P l| 2wi t=1

where, γt (i) is the posterior probability. We then concatenate all the Gµi and Gσi
to form the 2DK-dimension Fisher Vector P l.f , where D is the dimensionality of a
clip-level feature vector Clt .f .
For audio, we found that computing the Fisher Vector directly from frame-based
features (small audio intervals near a frame) and bypassing the clip-level features
performs better than averaging MFCC features over a clip. In this case, the bag of
frame-level features will consist of all the feature vectors from all the clips of the video
(and not just the initial 10 seconds in the 30 second window).
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Histogram features. We compute three types of histogram features for every basic
feature such as Facial Action Units, Eye/Head movement, and Amazon Rekognition
features. These are histograms of frame-level features, histograms of clip-level features, and combination of the first two.
For a player P l and a basic frame feature fh , we have a set of all feature values for
all frames {f rst .fh }, where f rst ∈ Clt and Clt ∈ P l (or a set of clip-level features
{Cl1 .fh , Cl2 .fh , . . . , Cl|P l| .fh } where Cli ∈ P l.). We build a histogram of frame-level
features Vhf rames = hvh1 , vh2 , . . . , vhb i where vhi are frequencies of values f rst .fh falling
into the ith bin, and b is the number of bins (similarly Vhclips = hvh1 , vh2 , . . . , vhb i for
a histogram of clip-level features). We form a histogram feature by concatenating histograms for all or some of basic features P l.f = hVhf1rames , Vhf2rames , . . .i (or
P l.f = hVhclips
, Vhclips
, . . .i for clip-level histograms). For the same player P l and a
1
2
basic feature fh , we have a set of clip-level features {Cl1 .fh , Cl2 .fh , . . . , Cl|P l| .fh }
where Cli ∈ P l. We build a histogram Vhclips = hvh1 , vh2 , . . . , vhb i where vhi are frequencies of values Clt .fh falling into ith bin and b is the number of bins. We form
a histogram feature by concatenating histograms for all or some of basic features
P l.f = hVhclips
, Vhclips
, . . .i.
1
2
Finally, we also build combined histogram features by concatenating frame-level histograms and clip-level histograms of the same combination of features
D
E
f rames
clips
P l.f = Vhf1rames , Vhclips
,
V
,
V
,
.
.
.
.
h2
h2
1
Optimal number of bins b is determined through cross-validation.

3.1.3

Ensemble classifier

The previous steps associate with each player pij a feature vector f v(pij ) represented by
the basic features or associated LiarRank features listed above at the player level (aggregating from frame- and clip-levels as described above). Thus, there are five types
of features: LiarRank of Fisher Vector of VGG Face, Facial Action Units, Rekognition
Emotions, Eye/Head movement, and MFCC. We trained a suite of classifiers and
used them to produce a late fusion model. Each classifier returns a score denoting
the probability of a subject being a spy. If Si is the score returned by a classifier for
the ith feature type for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, then the final score S is obtained by late fusion
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of named models:
S=

5
X

αi Si ,

i=1

P
where 5i=1 αi = 1. Late fusion weights αi are obtained by grid-search and crossvalidation. For each of the five types of features, we select the best classifier, and
combine them as above via late fusion.

3.2

Experimental results

We use videos of 285 players from 44 Resistance games. We split the dataset into 10
folds by games, i.e. all players from a game are in either the training or the testing
part of a fold. Our classifier suite includes: k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Logistic
Regression (LR), Gaussian Naive Bayes (NB), Linear SVM (L-SVM), and Random
Forest (RF). As a performance metric we report the mean AUC over 10 folds.
For LiarRank feaures, we had to employ the greedy feature selection (FS) technique
due to the very large dimensionality of the feature vectors. This procedure works
as follows. We start with an empty feature vector as a base. At the beginning of
each iteration, the base vector’s length is L (L ≥ 0). We form new feature vectors
by adding to the base one feature from the LiarRank vector at a time if that feature
is not in the base yet. We then train a classifier on the newly formed features of
the length L + 1. We then select the best-performing feature and use it as a base
for the next iteration. This process repeats until there is no increase in performance
metrics on the validation set. To accommodate a 10-fold setting, we perform this
process in the nested loop. For each fold, we set it aside as a testing fold. We then
perform 9-fold cross-validation to determine the best-performing feature vector that
we subsequently test on the testing fold.

3.2.1

Prediction using single-feature classifiers

LiarRank. Table 3.1 shows performance of different aggregations from VGG Facebased and MFCC-based features including LiarRank. As a baseline we use the feature
obtained by averaging all frame-level VGG Face features. This baseline does not even
achieve 0.55 AUC, which means simple averaging is not a good strategy to capture
the relevant behavior of a player over a long video.
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Features

RF

L-SVM

NB

LR

KNN

Average VGG Face (baseline)
0.516
VGG Face clip-level voting
0.503
FV of VGG Face
0.468
FV of VGG Face + FS
0.506
LiarRank of FV of VGG Face + FS 0.639

0.533
0.520
0.573
0.470
0.647

0.549 0.546 0.50
0.550 0.527 0.479
0.502 0.584 0.502
0.491 0.467 0.522
0.663 0.652 0.603

FV of MFCC frame-level
FV of MFCC clip-level

0.395
0.441

0.56
0.533

0.606
0.586

0.608 0.579
0.579 0.595

Table 3.1: Performance (AUC) of different aggregations of visual (VGG Face) and
audio (MFCC) representations. Top to bottom: 1. Average pooling of all frames;
2. Clip-level VGG Face features are used to train and test, scores are averaged for
player-level inference; 3. Fisher Vector of clip-level VGG Face features; 4. Fisher
Vector of clip-level VGG Face features after feature selection procedure; 5. LiarRank
of the Fisher Vector of clip-level VGG Face features after feature selection; 6. Fisher
Vector of all MFCC features; 7. Fisher Vector of clip-level MFCC features.
Another baseline we explore is to consider every clip-level feature as a point in the
dataset, and to assign each clip the label of the player this clip belongs to. To
generate player-level predictions, we perform inference for every clip and average
clip-level predictions. The highest AUC we achieve using VGG Face is 0.55, which
supports the claim that for deceptive behavior detection it is necessary to consider
video as a whole.
Fisher Vector (FV) is better than the above baselines, achieving an AUC of 0.584.
We attribute this to the fact that FV captures statistical information from the whole
video rather than from a short clip.
Finally, LiarRank of Fisher Vector of VGG Face feature obtains the highest 0.663
AUC after feature selection (FS), and this improvement is statistically significant
(p < 0.01). To verify that improvement comes from the proposed meta-feature and
not merely from feature selection procedure, we perform feature selection on Fisher
Vector of VGG Face (base feature for LiarRank in our experiments), which achieves
the highest AUC of 0.522. This experiment suggests that LiarRank is important for
the improvement in accuracy.

Histogram features. As baselines we use mean values of Amazon Rekognition
features, Facial Action Units and Eye/Head movement features over all the frames
in a video. Although some of these baselines (0.586 AUC for Amazon Rekognition,
0.6 AUC for Facial Action Units and 0.5 AUC for Eye/Head movement) outperform
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Amazon Rekognition
Frame hist.
Disgusted, Surprised
Surprised
Calm
All features

0.630
0.622
0.622
0.557

Frame hist.
AU07+AU10+AU12
AU12+AU23+AU25
AU09+AU10+AU12
All features

Combined

Smile, Angry, Disgusted 0.634
Smile , Angry
0.623
Smile, Disgusted, Calm 0.618
All features
0.544
Facial Action Units

Smile, Angry, Disgusted 0.676
Smile, Disgusted
0.647
Angry
0.638
All features
0.563

Clip hist.

Combined

0.621 AU06+AU14
0.609
0.614 AU07+AU09+AU10
0.606
0.612 AU07+AU14+AU45
0.603
0.592 All features
0.577
Eye/Head movement

Frame hist.
3+8
3
3+7
All features

Clip hist.

Clip hist.
0.632
0.624
0.615
0.591

1+6+8
1+6
1+3+6+8
All features

AU07+AU09+AU10
AU07+AU10+AU23
AU12+AU25
All features

0.621
0.617
0.611
0.608

Combined
0.671 1+3+4+5+6+8
0.642 1+3+5+8
0.636 1+3+5+6+8
0.560 All features

0.643
0.627
0.625
0.618

Table 3.2: Performance (AUC) of histogram based representations: top three subsets
and all features for frame-level histograms, clip-level histograms, and combined histograms. In all cases sets of all features perform worse than proper subsets due to
excessive noise introduced by irrelevant features. For Action Units numbers refer to
FACS [46]. Movement features encoding is the following: 1–2: horizontal and vertical
eyes movements, 3–5: Euler angles of head rotations, 6–8: x, y, z head translations.
VGG Face baselines, they are significantly inferior to histogram-based player-level
features based on corresponding frame-level features.
Each aforementioned frame-level representation consists of several features corresponding to individual emotions or facial expressions, not all of which are useful for
the task of deception detection. To address this problem, we perform cross-validation
with exhaustive search through all possible combinations of features within every representation. So, when computing histogram vectors, we concatenate histograms of a
subset of features.
Table 3.2 shows that different ways of producing histograms (from frame-level features and from clip-level features) perform differently not just in terms of classification
performance but also in terms of best subset of features. In case of Amazon Rekognition features and Facial Action Units, it is advantageous to use combined histogram
features. For Eye/Head movement features, however, clip-level histograms yield the
best performance.
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Figure 3.3: Examples of facial expressions (left to right): Angry, Smile, Disgusted as
detected by Amazon Rekognition service, AU07 (lid tightened), AU09 (nose wrinkled),
AU10 (upper lip raised) as detected using the OpenFace library.
Our experiments show that for Amazon Rekognition based features, the combination of three expressions “Smile”, “Angry”, and “Disgusted” performs the best and
achieves 0.676 AUC. For Facial Action Units, the combination of AU07 (Lid Tightener), AU09 (Nose Wrinkler), and AU10 (Upper Lip Raiser) achieves 0.621 AUC. The
combination of horizontal eyes movements and x, z head translations achieves 0.671
AUC. Examples of top-performing facial expressions are shown in Figure 3.3 (except
for movement samples as those are dynamic). In all cases representations including
all the individual feature histograms (“All features” in Table 3.2) perform worse than
some of the subsets.

Classifiers

AUC

F1

FNR

FPR

Precision

Recall

LR+RF+NB+L-SVM+NB
0.705 0.466 0.621
LR+L-SVM+NB+L-SVM+NB 0.705 0.466 0.610
KNN+RF+NB+RF+NB
0.704 0.403 0.673
NB+L-SVM+NB+L-SVM+NB 0.704 0.406 0.667
LR+KNN+NB+L-SVM+NB
0.704 0.468 0.620

0.142
0.169
0.173
0.151
0.143

0.666
0.660
0.622
0.624
0.684

0.379
0.390
0.327
0.333
0.380

Table 3.3: Performance (AUC) of Top 5 ensemble models. Classifiers in the table
are trained on the features in the following order: histograms of AU07, AU09, AU10;
Fisher Vectors of MFCC; histograms of Smile, Angry, Disgusted; histograms of horizontal eyes movement, x and z head movement; LiarRank of VGG Face Fisher Vector.

3.2.2

Ensemble Prediction and Feature Importance

For our ensemble classifier, we use five best performing features: histogram features of
facial action units (AU07, AU09, AU10), Fisher Vectors of MFCC, histogram features
of Amazon Rekognition predictions (Smile, Angry, Disgusted), histogram features of
best movement feature combinations in Table 3.2 and LiarRank of VGG Face Fisher
Vector. Since for single-feature experiments we use a number of classifiers, we perform
exhaustive search through all possible combinations of classifiers for the mentioned
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features. Once single-feature classifiers are trained, we perform late fusion using
grid search as described in the Section 3.1.3. Table 3.3 shows our Top-5 ensemble
prediction results, including what classifiers were used for the corresponding features.
Our best predictive models yield an AUC of 0.705.
To assess the importance of features for the ensemble classifier, we repeated the
process leaving out one class of features at a time. We show the results of this ablation
experiment in Table 3.4. We can see that LiarRank of VGG Face Fisher Vectors and
the Emotion (Amazon Rekognition) histogram features are the most important as
the performance drops the most when they are absent.
Removed feature

AUC

F1

MFCC
0.703 0.463
E/H Movement
0.703 0.508
FAUs
0.702 0.448
Amazon Rekognition 0.688 0.524
LiarRank
0.688 0.411

FNR

FPR

Precision

Recall

0.610
0.548
0.598
0.485
0.344

0.175
0.197
0.209
0.281
0.721

0.655
0.599
0.587
0.556
0.104

0.390
0.452
0.402
0.516
0.560

Table 3.4: Classification performance (AUC) when one feature class is left out in
ensemble predictions. Features details are in Table 3.3.

3.2.3

Human Study

To assess the complexity of the task and obtain some objective baseline we conducted
a human study using the Amazon Mechanical Turk service1 . To provide a fair comparison, we presented workers with the same data we are using for testing our model:
we stitched 10-second clips together with a 1 second transition between them keeping
the sound on. Workers were provided with a brief description of the game they were
about to watch as shown in Figure 3.4a and asked to make a decision whether the
player in the video was a spy or a member of the resistance. We programmatically
ensured that the subjects cannot submit the answers until they finish watching the
video. To further verify the quality of annotations, workers were asked to provide
written justification for their decision and answer two questions about the content of
the video as shown in Figure 3.4b.
We selected 10 games containing 66 videos in total, and got every video annotated by
3 different workers. Correct player’s role was guessed by a majority (2–3 workers out
of 3) only in 53% of videos. We also used the average vote of turkers as a prediction
1

https://www.mturk.com/
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.4: Setup of the human study. Instructions explained what subjects should
do and the rules of the game subjects were about to watch (a). A set of questions
was designed to ensure the subjects watched the entire video carefully (b).
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Spies

Villagers

facial expressions, visible emotions, looking nervous
lack of interest, lack of participation, looking bored
staying quiet, talking little
observed others, tried to remain in the background
laughed or smiled nervously, laughed with others
acted guilty, acted sucpiciously
smiling, laughter
body language
became sad when villagers win, smiled when spies win

did nothing suspicious
admitted to be a villager, denied being a spy
distrusted others, accused others of being spies
team player, tried helping out
clueless, not interested, confused
casual, laid back, funny, friendly
quiet, focused, observing the game
body language
happy when team succeeds

Table 3.5: Human study: most popular justifications for decisions sorted by popularity.
score for the video. In this case, the AUC for human prediction is 0.583, while our
ensemble predictor gets 0.701 AUC for the same data (p < 0.01). This suggests that
detecting deception in long videos is a hard task for humans. We also found that
in more than 80% of the videos, players were suspected to be spies when the actual
ratio of spies in the dataset was 42%. This means that humans, when presented
with the fact that a player could be a spy, tend to interpret a player’s behavior as
suspicious. We also present the most common justifications annotators gave for their
judgments in Table 3.5. We can see that the range of clues that humans pay attention
to is wide sometimes including mutually contradictory observations: some annotators
thought smile and laughter is a sign of a spy, others thought it is a sign of a villager,
some turkers attributed quiet behavior to attempts at staying stealthy while others
connected quietness with attempts at observing others and figuring out who are the
spies.

3.3

Conclusion

We presented an ensemble based automated deception detection framework called
LiarOrNot which predicts deception in a group setting by processing long videos. Our
framework utilizes appropriate representations at different temporal resolutions for
multiple features which capture low and high level information. We also propose
a novel class of meta-features called LiarRank which provide a significant boost in
overall performance. By evaluating LiarOrNot on a dataset which was collected across
different sites, in a rigorous cross-validation based testing protocol which separated
identities and games during training and inference, we obtained an AUC greater than
0.7, which was 12% better than average humans.
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Figure 3.5: Screenshot of LiarOrNot demo. We demonstrate two 30-second clips from
the Resistance dataset and show how this player’s predicted deception scores compare
to other players in the same group.
In addition to that we have built a prototype LiarOrNot system demonstrating the
performance of our methods. In our demo1 , we opted to show several players from
our dataset. For each player we demonstrate two 30-second samples of video. We
visualize the predicted probabilities of the player being a spy from our best five
individual predictors (Figure 3.5). We compare how these predictions correspond to
prediction for the rest of the players in the same game. Additionally, we show AMT
workers’ opinions on the player’s role, as well as our system’s final prediction and the
ground truth role.

1

https://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~mbolonkin/liar-or-not/demo/
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Chapter 4
Political deception detection
We often put trust in the elected officials we vote for. But is this trust warranted?
On their campaign trails politicians make a lot of statements carefully crafted to
elicit support from their base. However, for a regular person distinguishing a truthful
statement from a statement that just looks truthful sometimes is a hard task without
proper research. With the spread of misinformation through social and mass media
the need in fact-checking resources significantly increased. Such fact-checking enterprises as PolitiFact or FactCheck.org analyze the content of the statements made by
politicians and determine whether the statements are true or false.
This, however, begs the question: why not apply automated deception detection
methods to this problem? There is a significant number of research papers on deception detection from audio [101, 54], text [67, 96], and video [122, 158, 3, 134].
Therefore, we consider the following task: given a video of a political figure making
a public statement predict whether the statement is truthful or deceitful.
In addition to general deception detection challenges, his task has its own:
• First, there is an obvious lack of publicly available multimodal datasets for this
task: the sole available dataset [100] contains only text and restricts itself to
only US politicians,
• Second, it is obvious that the veracity of the statement may depend on the
subject area of that statement. For instance, it is possible that a politician will
be honest about some topics but less honest about more controversial topics
such as aspects of his or her past private life, his or her medical or financial
records, and so forth. Still, it is not immediately clear how to analyze the
content in the broader context.
In an attempt to overcome these challenges, we make the following novel contributions:
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1. We collect a dataset of public figures from several countries worldwide making
truthful and deceptive statements. We call this dataset the Global Political
Deception Dataset. It is the first multimodal dataset of its kind with subjects
with subjects from a wide array of countries;
2. We propose a novel graph with nodes representing videos of politicians, topics
of the messages, and news articles about those politicians: this method allows
putting the content of the analyzed statement into a broader context and assess
how likely it is to be deceptive;
3. We develop a novel class of features we call Deception Score that brings together intrinsic properties of the video (how likely it is to be deceptive) with
the assessment of how likely the message from the video to be deceptive;
4. We show that our proposed Deception Score in conjunction with basic features
greatly improve upon basic features alone and a comprehensive set of baselines.

4.1

Global Political Deception Dataset

We aim at building a multimodal dataset of real-life examples of political deception. There is a noticeable lack of high-stakes deception datasets. Apart from the
widely used Real-Life Trial dataset [122], text-based LIAR dataset for fake news detection [154], and text-based CT-CWC-18 corpus [100], there is only one relevant dataset
containing videos of United States politicians making true or false statements [76],
but as of the writing of this dissertation the dataset is not publicly available yet.
Moreover, the latter dataset is focused on public figures from a single country. We
want to create a collection of examples of political deception across different countries and different languages. We call our new dataset the Global Political Deception
Dataset.

Dataset collection. Overview of the dataset creation process is shown in Figure 4.1. The primary task was to search for videos of political figures making statements verified by one or more fact-checking resources as false. Examples of such
resources are “Ojo Publico”1 , “Africa Check”2 , “ABC News”3 , and others. We col1

https://ojo-publico.com/
https://africacheck.org/
3
https://www.abc.net.au/
2
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Translation
Labels

Gaya ng napakarami sa atin
nababahala din sila humaharap
ako sa inyo ngayon para ibahagi
ang kanilang mga

As so many of us are concerned
they are also I turn to you today
to share their insights and
recommendations

from equitable share the county
government gets six billion actually
make double of what I get from the
national government

it's not just about the electricity
market which is 33% of the
emissions outcomes, it's also about
transportation waste

Global Political
Deception Dataset
Video data

Transcription

Figure 4.1: Global Political Deception Dataset creation process. We first find videos of
politicians making statements fact-checked to be true or false. Then we automatically
transcribe the videos. For videos in languages other than English we perform automated translation. Collected videos, transcripts, and translations form our dataset.
lected a total of 104 videos depicting politicians and public figures in various settings
such as political debates, interviews, and public speeches, one per person. Then for
each person in the dataset, we collected a video with a true statement verified the
same way. We primarily collected the videos from YouTube, with some videos coming
from social networks such as Facebook or directly from news agencies’ websites. We
also acknowledge that despite calling the statements truthful and deceitful, there is no
evidence to conclude that the public figure making that statement is knowingly lying.
Sometimes public figures can make false statements because of the sincere belief in it
or because of the lack of knowledge on the topic. We, however, use the fact-checked
labels as a proxy to deception similar to other works on political deception [84, 76].
After initial collection, we discard the videos that were very noisy or did not have
the face of the politician. We then extracted automatically generated transcripts.
Some of the videos were in languages that did not support automated transcription
(e.g., Mongolian language). We excluded those videos from the dataset. Overall, we
ended up with 148 videos (75 with false statements and 73 with true statements)
depicting 76 public figures from 18 countries. If videos and transcripts were in any
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Figure 4.2: Examples from the Global Political Deception Dataset. From left to right,
top row: Festus Keyamo (Nigeria), Katie Allen (Australia); bottom row: Leni Robredo (Philippines), Mwangi wa Iria (Kenya).
language other than English, we used Google Translate API1 to translate it into
English automatically.

Dataset description. Our dataset contains videos, automated original transcripts,
and automated translations of the transcripts into English if the original language is
other than English. Videos span lengths from 10 seconds to 1200 seconds with a
median length of 30 seconds. Figure 4.2 shows some examples of the videos in our
dataset. Table 4.1 shows excerpts of transcripts.
Our dataset contains 76 public figures from 18 countries. Out of them, 14 are female,
and the rest are male. This gender bias reflects the general situation in politics across
the world. We obtained samples from each region of the world. Retrieval of labeled
data and associated textual data for the purposes of this research, however, led to
skew in geographic distribution (see Figure 4.3 for the distribution).
1

https://cloud.google.com/translate

45

CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL DECEPTION DETECTION
Politician

True statements

False statements

William Ruto
(Kenya)

we were told in 2017 that you cannot win
an election on the basis over development
track record as a government you need
some emotional things you need to appeal
to emotion you need to appeal to your
community you need to appeal to but we
said no Kenyans can see for themselves

diaspora is an important component of our
development architecture in fact the diaspora is the largest contributor of our foreign exchange I think upwards of maybe
290 billion last year which is a huge contribution by a community out there that
we we haven’t reached out sufficiently

Imelda Marcos
(Philippines)

you fall in love with the man you marry
the minute you were born because she
starts again dreaming you’re kind of a
dream man and suddenly here he comes

well now it’s my best defense because
when the world went to my closet to email
this concept they did not find skeletons
they find beautiful shoes

Bashar Asad
(Syria)

we have fully believed in negotiations and
in political actions since the beginning of
the crisis however if we negotiate it does
not mean that we will stop fighting terrorism

were in the area of the militants we’re in
the area under the control of the terrorists that were they that were they could
accuse first the people or the militant that
are responsible of the security of this convoy so we don’t have any idea about what
happened

Veronica
Alonso
(Uruguay)

what we were saying is just two precandidates but we are I think two candidates with strength with desire and above
all we hope to have the most support

we turn on the income of officials let’s
cut with something look and checking
the numbers and doing numbers with the
team there are more than 2500 or more
positions of trust that represents approximately $7 million per month we can not
cut it may seem a little for the number
but each of those numbers make the final
difference

Table 4.1: Excerpts of transcripts of false and true statements. Parts of the false
statement that were fact-checked as false are marked in italics. Veronica Alonso’s
transcript is automatically translated from Spanish.

4.2

Methodology

To approach the problem of deception detection in public statements, we exploit the
fact that the statements of interest are usually made about topics of public importance. In other words, there is a significant chance that the same issues were discussed
(with or without connection to the public figure that made the analyzed statement)
somewhere else, particularly in news articles. This is a novel part of our approach.
We discuss these features in more details in the next section followed by an overview
of some basic features that we also explored in this work.
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Asia
Africa
9.21%
Australia

26.32%
15.79%
5.26%
Europe
43.42%

South America
Figure 4.3: Geographical distribution of politicians’ countries of origin in the dataset.

4.2.1

Deception scores

To analyze the truthfulness of a statement made by a public figure, we can consider
the broad context of the statement. Clearly, some topics may not be worth lying
about, and others draw a lot of attention and are prone to misrepresentations or
explicit lies. We define the novel concept of a Video-Article-Topic (VAT) graph
G = (V, T, A, EV T , EAT ) to be a tripartite graph. An edge (v, t) ∈ EV T ((a, t) ∈ EAT
respectively) indicates that a video v ∈ V (an article a ∈ A respectively) mentions
topic t ∈ T , weighted by w(v, t) (w(a, t) respectively). We define the following node
and edge attributes.
Edge anomaly δ(a, t), δ(v, t). This value measures how anomalous a given text a ∈ A
is among other texts generated by a given topic t ∈ T (a transcript of a video v ∈ V
respectively). We define the edge anomaly δ(a, t) to be the deviation of the weighted
sentiment value of the article s(a) from the average weighted sentiment value of all
articles generated by the same topic t:
P

(a0 ,t)∈EAT

δ(a, t) = w(a, t)s(a) −

P

w(a0 , t)s(a0 )

(a0 ,t)∈EAT

w(a0 , t)

.

(4.1)

In a similar way we define the Video-Topic edge anomaly. These values are meant
to represent how different is a particular article or video transcript among those
generated by the same topic. If, for example, most of the articles on the given topic
express sentiment, then the average sentiment will be positive, and an article with
47

CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL DECEPTION DETECTION

Videos (V)

Topics (T)
t1

δ(v1 ) v1

Articles (A)

w(a1 , t1 )

w(v1 , t2 )

a1 s(a1 )
t2
a2 s(a2 )

δ(v2 ) v2

t3
a3 s(a3 )

···
δ(vn ) vn
w(vn , tk )

t4

···

···

am s(am )

tk

w(am , tk )

Figure 4.4: Video-Article-Topic (VAT) graph. First, we extract topics (T ) from an
independent news dataset using Latent Dirichlet Allocation [19]. Then for a set of
articles (A), we use obtained LDA model to extract topic assignments. Finally, for
each video transcript (V ), we estimate the probability of being generated by each of
the topics using the same LDA model.
negative sentiment will produce a larger difference in the Equation (4.1). The more
different an article in sentiment, the higher value will edge anomaly take.
Topic controversy c(t) of a given topic t ∈ T is defined as an entropy of normalized
sentiment values among all articles generated by this topic:
c(t) = H ŝ(a, t)

(a,t)∈EAT



,

(4.2)

where ŝ(a, t) = P w(a,t)s(a)
0
0 , and H(·) is the entropy function. There is the
(a,t)∈EAT w(a ,t)s(a )
following intuition behind this definition. A topic with a single shared view on it is
hardly controversial. Thus entropy of a set of almost equal values will be low. On the
other hand, if the sentiments about the topic are uniformly spread over all possible
values, that would mean that there are many different opinions on the topic, and the
entropy will be relatively high.
Finally, we define the video deception score V D(v) for each video v ∈ V , topic
deception score T D(t) for each topic t ∈ T , and an edge deception score D(v, t) for
each edge (v, t) ∈ EV T . The intuition behind these scores is to represent the odds
of a given video to deceive on a given topic, as well as odds of the given video being
deceptive, and a given topic to have a high chance of generating false statements.
We want the edge deception score D(v, t) to be high if both video and topic have high
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chances of being deceptive, and the edge (v, t) itself presents itself as anomalous.
D(v, t) =

δ(v, t) + γ1 V D(v) + γ2 T D(t)
1 + γ1 + γ2

(4.3)

Video v must have high deception score when it has a substantial number of edges
with high deception scores:
P

δ(v) + α

w(v, t)D(v, t)

(v,t)∈EV T

V D(v) =

P

1+α

,

w(v, t)

(4.4)

(v,t)∈EV T

where δ(v), the anomaly of a video v is the intrinsic property of the video.
Lastly, the deception score of a topic t is related to its controversy c(t), lying scores
of incoming edges D(v, t) and anomaly of incoming edges δ(a, t).
1
T D(t) =
c(t) + β1
Φ(t)

!
X

w(v, t)D(v, t) + β2

(v,t)∈EV T

X

w(a, t)δ(a, t) ,

(4.5)

(a,t)∈EAT

where Φ is the normalizing factor:
Φ(t) = 1 + β1

X

w(v, t) + β2

(v,t)∈EV T

X

w(a, t).

(a,t)∈EAT

In equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 numbers α, β1 , β2 , γ1 , γ2 are the hyper-parameter weights
determining importance of corresponding summands in the equations.
In the end, we have a set of recurrent equations that we can solve iteratively or with a
closed-form solution. For the closed form solution, we first substitute Equation (4.3)
into Equation (4.4) and Equation (4.5). After simplifying, we have a system of equations:
"
#"
# " #
A11 A12 VD
B1
=
.
(4.6)
A21 A22 TD
B2
In this equation
VD = [V D(v1 ), V D(v2 ), . . . , V D(vN )]T
and
TD = [T D(t1 ), T D(t2 ), . . . , T D(tK )]T
are vectors of video and topic deception scores respectively (with N and K being
number of videos and number of topics respectively). Matrix A11 is a diagonal matrix
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with elements
A11 (i, i) =

αγ1
(1 + α)(1 + γ1 + γ2 )

X

w(vi , t) − 1.

(vi ,t)∈EV T

Matrix A22 is a diagonal matrix with elements
A22 (i, i) =

β2 γ2
Φ(ti )(1 + γ1 + γ2 )

X

w(v, ti ) − 1.

(v,ti )∈EV T

Matrix A12 has elements
(
A12 (i, j) =

αγ2 w(vi ,tj )
,
(1+α)(1+γ1 +γ2 )

if (vi , tj ) ∈ EV T

0,

otherwise.

Similarly we define matrix A21 :
(
A21 (i, j) =

β1 γ1 w(vj ,ti )
,
Φ(ti )(1+γ1 +γ2 )

if (vj , ti ) ∈ EV T

0,

otherwise.

We can solve the Equation (4.6) using one of the matrix decomposition algorithms.
The solution will be the fixed point of Equations (4.3)–(4.5).
Iterative way to find the fixed point is to choose some initial values for V D(vi ) and
T D(tj ), substitute into the equations (4.3)–(4.5), find the updated values of these
variables, and keep repeating this process until convergence.
Having all values for D(v, t) we can form a feature vector for a given video
[D(v, t1 ), . . . , D(v, tK )] ,
where K is the number of topics.
Deception scores can differ based on hyper-parameters weights or the video anomaly
δ(v) used in the equation (4.4). This anomaly value can be any scalar or vector
representing how anomalous the video is on its own. We used the classification scores
obtained from several baseline models.
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4.2.2

Basic features

Most of the deception researchers agree that an act of lying can have “leaks”, cues
to the internal state of the deceiving person [25]. Thus, most deception detection
methods are trying to detect those cues, whether via physiological parameters (heart
rate, sweating levels, electric conductivity, etc.) or from changes in facial expressions
or speech (changes in pitch, speed of uttering words, linguistic patterns).
The Global Political Deception Dataset contains videos, audios, and transcripts. We
therefore consider a set of features for each of these modalities. These features were
also used in one or more previous works on deception detection.
Visual features. To obtain representations of the video content, we first extract
the Facial Action Units (FAUs) from the recordings using an off-the-shelf software
OpenFace [12]. We then calculate histograms of these intensities with a fixed number
of bins as in Chapter 3.
Audio features. There are two types of audio features that we use in this work.
• Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients [35] which captures lower-level information
about the sound wave.
• Second type is a set of individual features extracted by OpenSMILE software [49]. These features were used in a number of papers and showed their
efficiency for speech analysis [84, 76, 106].
Text features. To analyse the transcripts we use the following text and linguistic
features:
• BERT embeddings. Transformer architectures have shown great success in recent years and became de facto the standard tool for text analysis [41, 145]. For
all texts we extract [CLS] token embedding from a pretrained BERT-Base, Uncased model [41]. Whenever a text is longer than 512 tokens, we use head+tail
truncation method as described in [139]: we leave the first 128 and the last 382
tokens.
• TF-IDF vector [72] for unigrams, bi-grams, tri-grams, and four-grams.
• LIWC feature vector. We used LIWC 2007 and LIWC 2015 software [140] to
extract frequencies of word occurrence from 64 and 90 categories respectively.
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4.3

Experimental results

We test our method against a set of baseline methods on the Global Political Deception
Dataset.

4.3.1

Baselines

We compare our methods to a number of baselines from the relevant literature.
1. Uni-modal features from [158]: Fisher Vectors of Improved Dense Trajectories
(iDT), Fisher Vectors of MFCC, Fisher Vector of Glove representations of the
transcripts.
2. Facial Action Units histograms and Head/Eye movement histograms from [9]:
we use the best frame-based features as in our dataset we do not have long
enough videos to justify splitting into 10-second clips. We use the combinations
that shown the best results on the Resistance dataset [9], and we also perform
an exhaustive search for the best combination as described in the same work.
3. Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN), Base Network trained on the timeseries of FAU intensities from [138].
4. Acoustic, Linguistic, and Visual features as well as their combinations used for
political deception detection in [76].
5. Textual (LIWC, TF-IDF, and BERT), Acoustic (ComParE) features, and their
ensemble used to detect deception in political debates by [84].

4.3.2

Experimental setup

We split the Global Political Deception Dataset into ten approximately equal folds
trying to keep the balance of classes. We ensured that videos of the same public figure
do not fall into different folds. Our experiments use a battery of standard classifiers:
k-Nearest Neighbor, Logistic Regression, Gaussian Naive Bayes, and Random Forest.
We use mean AUC and F1-scores over ten folds as the performance metric. We test
our proposed feature types with each classifier as mentioned above and report the
best metric for any given class of features among all used classifiers.
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For baseline features, we use the same classifiers as described in each corresponding
paper: decision tree classifier for [76], Logistic Regression for [84], a battery of classifiers as described above for [9, 158]. We implemented the Base Network TCN [138]
according to the description from the paper. We used the same training/evaluation
protocol as in the original work.

4.3.3

Building VAT graph

To build the VAT graph, we need to mine news articles, extract topics, and find
Article-Topic associations.
For that, we collected a set of news articles using Nexis Uni1 news sources database.
For each video in our dataset, we mined news articles that mentioned the public
figure from the video and dated from no more than a month before the video release.
We also manually checked the articles to avoid duplicates of the same news story.
All pieces were in English. We ended up with 6337 articles with a minimum of 1, a
maximum of 104, and an average of 43 articles per video. We share these articles as
part of the Global Political Deception Dataset.
To extract topics, we chose a generic set of topics over a set specific for our set of
articles. In other words, we decided to extract topics specific for news texts in general
rather than for our limited set of news pieces. This choice would ensure that both
articles and transcripts are associated with at least one topic in the VAT graph. To
extract these topics we used a large news dataset “All the news”2 . This dataset
contains about 143,000 articles scraped from various news websites such as the New
York Times, CNN, Fox News, Buzzfeed News, Reuters, the Washington Post, and
others. The publication date of the news pieces from this dataset falls between July
2016 and July 2017. These texts allow us to extract a sufficiently rich set of topics.
We use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [19] to extract topics from the “All the
news” dataset. LDA is widely used for topic modeling of large corpora. We produce
two topic models: with 50 and 100 topics. Table 4.2 shows some examples of extracted
topics: each topic is represented by a distribution of words that generate this topic.
Some of the topics are very similar with a possible change in word importance; some
topics look drastically different when we allow for more topics to be formed.
1
2

https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/professional/academic/nexis-uni.page
https://www.kaggle.com/snapcrack/all-the-news
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LDA, 50 topics

LDA, 100 topics

water, area, city, people, mile, land, national,
road, storm, coast

water, storm, area, coast, mile, land, weather,
snow, river, region

drug, health, doctor, patient, medical, disease,
hospital, cancer, treatment, virus

drug, doctor, patient, medical, hospital, cancer,
treatment, health, disease, death

police, officer, gun, shooting, shot, department,
video, law, violence

church, christian, religious, god, faith, catholic,
religion, marriage, pope, francis

brazil, athlete, olympic, rio, gold, olympics,
world, sport, brazilian, fashion

brazil, cuba, castro, government, cuban,
president, country, brazilian, corruption, latin

islamic, syria, state, force, syrian, group, city,
iraq, militant

syria, syrian, air, rebel, aleppo, force, war, strike,
assad, government

Table 4.2: Examples of topics extracted by LDA (models with 50 and 100 topics). We
show up to 10 words that generate the corresponding topic. Words are sorted in the
order of decreasing probability for the given topic. Some of the topics produced by
the two models look similar with minor differences in word importance, while others
look drastically different.
We then use the trained LDA model to estimate the probability of each article and
each video transcript to be generated by these topics (which corresponds to the edge
weights w(a, t) and w(v, t) respectively).

4.3.4

Deception scores performance

To calculate the edge anomaly values and topic controversy, we need to find the sentiments of the articles and video transcripts. We use XLNet (large-uncased) transformer model [160] pre-trained on a Stanford Sentiment Treebank dataset [137] for
the task of sentiment analysis. This dataset has two levels of label granularity: binary labels (positive vs. negative) and 5-class labels from very negative (1) to very
positive (5). Once trained, the model outputs the probability of sentiment scores for
each sentence in the text (article or transcript). We calculate the final sentiment of
a text by averaging weighted mean sentiment over all sentences in the text (weights
being the estimated probabilities).
For video anomaly score δ(v) we use deception probability scores produced by several
baseline features: FAU histogram and Head/Eye movement histogram that produced
the best result on the Resistance dataset (Chapter 3). These values are calculated
from video alone.
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Metric

Feature type

LDA-50

LDA-100

Sent-2

Sent-5

Sent-2

Sent-5

AUC

DS Vector
DS Histogram

0.666
0.632

0.579
0.630

0.714
0.642

0.684
0.639

F1-score

DS Vector
DS Histogram

0.628
0.663

0.629
0.700

0.654
0.644

0.653
0.667

Table 4.3: Performance of our features. We show results for two metrics (AUC and
F1-score) for the best performing features for each of the features types, topic models,
and sentiment granularity. The difference between highest values and the rest of the
models is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
After the deception scores are calculated, we can build a vector representation (DS
Vector) for each video v ∈ V as follows: [D(v, t1 ), . . . , D(v, tk )] for all topics t ∈ T .
Thus, we have features of lengths 50 and 100. We also build feature vectors by
calculating histograms (DS Histogram) of video deception scores V D(v) calculated
from different hyper-parameter weights α, β1 , β2 , γ1 , γ2 . We use 100 bins for these
histograms.
Table 4.3 shows the performance of the best features for each of the two topic models,
two kinds of sentiment granularity, and two ways of building feature vectors.
We can see that Deception Scores calculated from LDA model with 100 topics always
outperforms models with 50 topics. Models that used binary sentiment (Sent-2) work
better than models with fine-grained sentiment predictions if we use AUC as a metric,
but situation is reversed when we use F1-score instead.

4.3.5

Individual features comparison

Table 4.4 shows the performance of our individual features against baseline and basic
features.
We can see that although basic TF-IDF feature performs the best according to both
metrics, our features are producing the second best result according to F1-score metric
and the third best result according to AUC, outperforming all other baselines and
staying close behind the textual features from [84].
Another observation from the Table 4.4 is that aggregation methods and classifiers
used to train are no less critical for the performance than the features themselves. For
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Source

Modality

Ours

Feature

F1-score

AUC

Accuracy

DS Vector, LDA-100, Sent-2
DS Histogram, LDA-50, Sent-5

0.636
0.700

0.714
0.540

0.628
0.541

iDT Fisher Vector
MFCC Fisher Vector
Glove Fisher Vector

0.513
0.588
0.647

0.537
0.514
0.660

0.541
0.554
0.635

FAUs Histogram (Resistance)
Head/Eye movement Histogram (Resistance)
FAU Histogram (our data)
Head/Eye movement Histogram (our data)

0.650
0.568
0.680
0.634

0.571
0.569
0.648
0.629

0.534
0.568
0.628
0.601

Wu et al. [158]

Visual
Acoustic
Textual

Chapter 3

Visual

Stathopoulos et al. [138]

Visual

Base Network TCN

0.463

0.563

0.540

Visual

Emotions
FAUs
Gaze
Pose
Vis Comb 1
Vis Comb 2
Vis Comb 3

0.427
0.471
0.513
0.496
0.494
0.609
0.489

0.527
0.464
0.513
0.492
0.526
0.593
0.513

0.481
0.467
0.517
0.491
0.527
0.588
0.510

0.404
0.556
0.500
0.556
0.599
0.510
0.470
0.500

0.456
0.594
0.508
0.549
0.585
0.495
0.482
0.548

0.462
0.595
0.512
0.550
0.586
0.502
0.485
0.548

Kamboj et al. [76]

Glove
LIWC 2015
Polarity
Linguistic POS
Unigrams
Ling Comb 1
Ling Comb 2
Ling Comb 3
Acoustic

IS09
IS13
IS09+IS13

0.530
0.565
0.552

0.533
0.581
0.519

0.534
0.581
0.520

Ensemble

Fusion-All
Fusion1-2M
Fusion1-3M
Fusion2-2M
Fusion2-3M
Fusion3-2M
Fusion3-3M

0.531
0.573
0.543
0.491
0.504
0.472
0.546

0.514
0.568
0.532
0.525
0.514
0.504
0.561

0.517
0.566
0.535
0.529
0.516
0.508
0.561

Textual

BERT
LIWC 2007
TF-IDF

0.663
0.570
0.718

0.718
0.579
0.722

0.635
0.581
0.624

Acoustic

ComParE

0.545

0.489

0.482

Ensemble

Probability Avg.

0.621

0.668

0.613

Kopev et al. [84]

Table 4.4: Individual features comparison. Refer to the corresponding papers for the
relevant description of individual features and combination details. The main metrics
of interest are ROC AUC and F1-score; accuracy is presented for reference only.
TF-IDF, BERT, and Deception Score features are significantly better than the rest
of the features (p < 0.01). Differences between these top-3 features are statistically
significant (p < 0.05).
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Our features

Basic Features

DS
DS
DS
DS
DS

TF-IDF [72, 84]
BERT [41, 84]
Probability Avg. [84]
Glove Fisher Vector [115, 158]

Vector, LDA-100, Sent-2
Vector, LDA-100, Sent-5
Vector, LDA-50, Sent-2
Histogram, LDA-100, Sent-2
Histogram, LDA-100, Sent-5

Table 4.5: Top-performing features used for ensemble models sorted in decreasing
order of performance (AUC).
example, both Kamboj et al. [76] and Wu et al. [158] use Glove word representations.
The former simply average the vectors over the text and use Random Forest classifier,
the latter use Fisher Vector aggregation and Logistic Regression as classifier. These
differences lead to more than 20% improvement.

4.3.6

Ensemble Models

We use the best features produced by our method and top performing basic features
to build an ensemble using late fusion (Table 4.5). If Si is the score returned by a
classifier for the ith feature type for i ∈ {1, . . . , K}, where K is the total number of
features in the ensemble, then the final score S is obtained by late fusion of named
models:
i=K
X
S=
αi Si ,
i=1

PK

where i=1 αi = 1. Late fusion weights αi are obtained by grid-search and crossvalidation. Due to computational reasons we choose K to be no more than 7.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the late fusion experiments. First, we note that the
best performing ensemble (consisting of the best two basic features and best three
our features) significantly improves upon the best individual feature from Table 4.4.
This ensemble yields 5.3% higher AUC than TF-IDF feature [84] (with p < 0.01).
Second, we can see that the best ensemble that consists only of basic features yields
4.6% lower AUC than the best performing ensemble. Moreover, for the sets of Top-2,
Top-3, and Top-4 basic features adding one or more of our proposed features into the
ensemble almost universally leads to improved performance. This fact demonstrates
that our Deception Score features are complementary to unimodal representations.
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Basic features
Our features
No features
Top-1
Top-2
Top-3
Top-4
Top-5

No features
0.714
0.671
0.692
0.684
0.669

Top-1

Top-2

Top-3

Top-4

0.722 0.729
0.712 0.749
0.726 0.753
0.697 0.775
0.697 0.775
0.697 0.773

0.726
0.739
0.756
0.754
0.754
0.751

0.692
0.761
0.751
0.761
0.751
—

Table 4.6: Late fusion results (AUC). Each number represents a performance (AUC)
of an ensemble of models consisting of certain number of basics features and certain
number of our proposed features (cf. Table 4.5).

4.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we considered the task of predicting deception in videos of political
figures making public statements. First, we collected a dataset for this task. This
Global Political Deception Dataset contains videos of public figures from 18 countries
across the world making true and false statements as verified by fact-checking resources. We then proposed a novel class of features we call Deception Score that
aimed at analyzing the content of the analyzed statement by putting it in a broader
context of texts about similar topics.
We tested the Deception Score features on our Global Political Deception Dataset and
demonstrated that they perform on par with the best baselines features and outperform most of the other baselines. We then used our best features and the best
basic features to build ensemble models that even further improve the system’s performance. We showed that the best ensemble outperforms the best individual feature by
5.3%. We also showed that adding Deception Score features to basic features consistently improves the ensemble performance. This means that Deception Score features
are complementary to the textual and other basic features.
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Chapter 5
DIPS: A Dyadic Impression
Prediction System for Group
Interaction Videos
There are many situations in group settings where we wish to understand the impressions that a person pi has of another person pj . For instance, in a diplomatic
negotiation, it might be critical for one side to understand the mutual feelings of people on the other side toward one another as this can provide important leverage. A
person called in to a business meeting with a group of people she doesn’t know might
wish to understand the like/dislike relationships between the people she is meeting
with.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of dyadic impression prediction using nonverbal cues. Specifically, we would like to use nonverbal cues such as facial action
units [12], facial emotions [89], gaze relationships [11], and more in order to predict
subject pi ’s impression about subject pj ’s likability. The surveys in the Resistance
game data capture capture likability through six survey questions designed to elicit
pi ’s impression of pj .
In order to predict these six types of dyadic impressions, we have developed a framework called DIPS (Dyadic Impression Prediction System). DIPS involves the following
novel features.
1. Emotion Ranks. We develop a novel class of features called emotion ranks.
It is well-known in social science (e.g. [36]) that the emotions of a subject pi
about a subject pj may be influenced by the emotions of others toward pj .
We first consider emotions of a dyad (pi , pj ) simultaneously and define emotion
score as the intensity of a given emotion on pi ’s face times the probability that
that emotion is directed from pi toward pj . Emotion rank takes these dyadic
emotion scores as input and uses gaze networks to account for the fact that user
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pi ’s impression of pj might depend not only on his facial emotions, but also that
of others, as well as his attitude toward those other individuals. This leads to a
complex interplay of emotions and network interactions that we aggregate. Past
work on predicting impressions [98] only considers direct gaze relationships and
does not consider such network interactions.
2. Social Balance Theory. Classical social network theory has identified the importance of triangles in friend/enemy networks. Such networks are called signed
networks [43, 50] in which edges can be positive or negative (whether ± 1 or
with positive or negative weights). Balance theory forms an important part of
social network theory going back to the time of Heider in the 1950s [66]. It
suggests that for a balanced triad (three individuals in this case), the products
of any pair of edge weights must be positive. Important phenomena explained
by balance theory include the ideas that “a friend of my friend is my friend”
and “an enemy of my enemy is my friend”. In this paper, we consider the effect
of a third party pk on the impression that pi has of pj via a class of features
that measure the degree of imbalance capturing pi ’s impressions of pj vis-a-vis
such third parties. To our knowledge, this is the first time that social balance
theory has been used for predicting impressions from nonverbal data.
3. Emotion, Facial Action Units, and Temporal Alignment. Social science theory [36] posits that pi ’s impression of pj and pj ’s impression of pi are not independent. Of course, we see this in our daily lives - if a person doesn’t like you,
you may not like them back. We might therefore get clues about pi ’s impression
of pj by looking at pj ’s facial emotions. We define a novel class of alignment
vectors that capture the alignment — with possible temporal delays in order to
account for subjects’ response times — between the facial emotions and action
units of subjects pi and pj .
4. Temporal Delayed Network. We introduce the novel concept of a Temporal Delayed Network which is a multi-layer network [37, 83] where each layer represents
a particular time point. Within a single layer, nodes correspond to players and
edges correspond to different interactions between players (e.g. look at, talk
to, listen to). Within a layer, edges are labeled with the probability that the
stated interaction occurs. Across layers, edges represent identity information
by linking the same individuals in different layers, as well as delayed interaction
information. To our knowledge, this is the first time that multi-layer networks
have been used in predicting impressions of subjects. Using this multi-layer
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network as an underlying graph, we build a Graph Convolution Network [82]
with an attention mechanisms [148] to learn representations and predict dyadic
impressions of pi toward pj .
Finally, we have implemented the DIPS framework as well as some baselines encompassing past work [10, 16, 98]. We show that DIPS is able to generate AUCs ranging
from 73–77% for the six dependent variables capturing impressions of a person pi
w.r.t. person pj , improves upon the performance of 8 competing baselines from the
literature by 19.9–30.8% in AUC and 12.6–47.2% in F1-score. We further conduct ablation tests to show that the novel features we introduce all contribute to this increase
in predictive performance.

5.1

Dataset analysis and task description

We test several baselines as well as our new Temporal Delayed Network approach
on the Resistance dataset. In most cases, players do not know each other, and the
majority of the players in our experiments never played this game or similar games
such as “Mafia” or “Werewolf” before. Prior to the game, players go through warmup activities to get familiar with each other as well as one practice round. After the
game, all players fill out a survey. In this chapter, we are interested in questions
related to players’ impressions of each other. In particular, we focus on the set of
questions in a post-game survey asking about the likeability of other players (see
Table 5.1). Players had to rate each other on six variables on a 7-point scale.

5.1.1

Dataset analysis

In this section, we conduct a brief statistical analysis of the data. Overall, the dataset
contains video and survey data for 348 players from 48 games with 135 of them playing
spy roles. Gender distribution is the following: 44% of players were male and 56%
were female. Participants were recruited from college student populations with a
median age of 21.
Hypothesis 1. First, we test the hypothesis that the gender of players affects the
impression, i.e., that females rate players differently than males, and that players
rate female and male players differently based on their own gender. Table 5.2 shows

61

CHAPTER 5. DYADIC IMPRESSION PREDICTION
Question #

Variables in the survey

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6

Very
Very
Very
Very
Very
Very

cold : Very warm
negative : Very positive
unpleasant : Very pleasant
unfriendly : Very friendly
unlikable : Very likable
unsociable : Very sociable

Table 5.1: All players had to fill in a survey for each of the other players pi rating
their perception on a 7-point scale for six questions. All questions had the same form
but different variables to rate: “Was Player pi friendly, likable, and pleasant or cold,
negative, and unfriendly?”. Note that in the original survey questions 2, 4, and 6
were offered in reversed order (lower rating for more positive perception). For the
purpose of our research we reversed the scale of these questions so that all survey
answers are aligned in polarity.
Rating player Rated player
Female
Female
Male
Male

Female
Male
Female
Male

Q1
4.94
5.05
5.01
4.95

(1.59)
(1.55)
(1.59)
(1.57)

Q2
4.87
4.93
4.99
4.79

(1.58)
(1.56)
(1.49)
(1.54)

Q3
5.17
5.21
5.23
4.99

(1.44)
(1.40)
(1.32)
(1.45)

Q4
4.87
4.99
5.10
4.83

(1.67)
(1.65)
(1.52)
(1.64)

Q5
5.21
5.23
5.32
5.04

(1.45)
(1.41)
(1.34)
(1.43)

Q6
4.78
4.86
4.82
4.76

(1.77)
(1.70)
(1.61)
(1.65)

Table 5.2: Gender-based distribution of scores: mean (std). We found no statistically
significant difference depending on genders of players.
the means and standard deviations of the variables depending on the gender of rating
and rated players. We used Mann-Whitney U-test and found no significant difference
between these groups.
Hypothesis 2. Second, we checked a similar hypothesis about impression differences
based on players’ roles in the game. Table 5.3 shows the corresponding means and
standard deviations. We did not find any significant differences in this case either.
Hypothesis 3. Table 5.4 shows that correlations between different ratings of questions
are relatively high, which means players who score other players high on one variable
tend to score the same players high on the other variables. The highest correlation
is for a question about Pleasant–Unpleasant and a question about Likable–Unlikable.
The lowest correlation is for questions Warm–Cold and Sociable–Unsociable.
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Rating player Rated player
Villager
Villager
Spy
Spy

Villager
Spy
Villager
Spy

Q1
5.12
4.80
4.93
5.14

(1.53)
(1.57)
(1.64)
(1.54)

Q2
5.05
4.78
4.75
5.04

Q3

Q4

Q5

(1.53) 5.25 (1.38) 5.08 (1.63) 5.32 (1.37) 5.00
(1.52) 5.05 (1.40) 4.83 (1.61) 5.10 (1.38) 4.58
(1.59) 5.10 (1.47) 4.88 (1.65) 5.14 (1.49) 4.74
(1.54) 5.23 (1.36) 4.95 (1.59) 5.28 (1.43) 4.89

Q6
(1.62)
(1.74)
(1.71)
(1.68)

Table 5.3: Role-based distribution of scores: mean (std). We found no statistically
significant difference depending on the roles of players.
Q2
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

0.63

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

0.71 0.56 0.68 0.49
0.70 0.68 0.63 0.59
0.64 0.78 0.56
0.67 0.64
0.56

Table 5.4: Mutual Spearman correlation between different variables. All correlations
are statistically significant with p ≤ 0.05.

5.1.2

Problem description.

Given the past social science findings that negative impressions are expressed via facial
expressions [56] (as opposed to positive impressions which may be “internalized” and
not facially expressed), we study the problem of predicting if player pi will have
a negative impression of player pj according to each of six variables in the survey
(Table 5.1). For this, we define the impression on a given variable to be positive if
player pi rates player pj as 4 or above on the 7-point scale, and negative for ratings
of 3 and below. In the Resistance dataset 11-23% of ratings are negative, which
is expected, as by default people tend to have a neutral or positive impression of
strangers. We observed this both in our own data and it has also been noted in
earlier social science research [22]. Yet interactions and observations of a person over
time (i.e. during the game) can change the impression to negative. Therefore, we
consider a binary classification problem of predicting negative impressions between
people according to each of the six variables (in other words, negative impression
rating is the positive class in our problem), with six tasks in total.

5.2

Methodology

Most of the social science and psychological literature acknowledges the role of emotions and expressed behavior in forming an impression of a person [64, 36]. We
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P1

GCN

Embeddings

Temporal Delayed
Network
P3

Interaction Network

P2

Emotion Rank

Late
Fusion

Sign Imbalance
FAU/Emotion
Alignment

Figure 5.1: DIPS framework. From frontal videos of players we extract: facial expressions and Interaction Networks (look-at, listen-to, talk-to). We use facial expressions
to calculate alignment features (Sec. 5.2.3). We use interaction networks and facial expressions to build Emotion Rank (Sec. 5.2.1) and Sign Imbalance (Sec. 5.2.2)
features. Furthermore, we use Interaction Networks to build and train our novel Temporal Delayed Network (Sec. 5.2.4) algorithm to produce player embeddings that we
use to predict impressions. Each of the feature classes is calculated using all three
Interaction Networks (but for the sake of simpilicity, only one is shown in the Figure).
Finally, we use individual predictions of all of these methods to build ensembles with
late fusion.
therefore use the emotions and facial action units extracted using off-the-shelf tools
([12, 89]) as inputs. After extracting these values for the whole video, we get the
vector of values P(pi , e) = [v1 (pi , e), v2 (pi , e), . . . , vT (pi , e)], where vt (pi , e) is either
the probability of emotion e [89] for player pi at time t, or the intensity of a particular facial action unit for OpenFace [12] As negative emotions are causes of negative
impressions according to social theories [64], we split emotional expressions into two
subsets: positive emotions E + (happy) and negative emotions E − (angry, disgusted,
fearful, sad).
To capture the dynamics of group interactions, we also consider three dynamic interaction networks GI = (VI , EI ) derived from [10, 11]: look-at, talk-to, and listento networks. Vertices in these networks are participants and edges are interactions
among them evolving over time. Formally, a vertex in any of these networks pi,t ∈ VI
represents player pi in the game at time t. Each directed edge (pi,t , pj,t ) ∈ EI has
an associated weight representing the probability of a particular interaction between
players pi and pj at time t: whether player pi looks at, talks to, or listens to player
pj . The probability of player pi talking to the player pj is defined as the product
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of probabilities of the player pi speaking (estimated from facial movements) and the
probability of the player pi looking at the player pj (estimated using the collective
classification approach in [11]). Similarly, the probability of the player pi listening
to player pj is defined as the product of probability of the player pi looking at the
player pj and the probability of the player pj speaking.
Figure 5.1 shows our overall DIPS framework, an ensemble of four novel components.
We extract facial expressions and Interaction Networks (look-at, listen-to, talk-to)
from the frontal videos of the players. Extraction of the interaction networks also uses
the layout of the players in space as described in [11]. We build our novel Emotion
Rank (Sec. 5.2.1) and Sign Imbalance (Sec. 5.2.2) features using the interaction
networks and facial expressions. We also use facial expressions to calculate our novel
alignment features (Sec. 5.2.3). Furthermore, we use Interaction Networks to build
and train Temporal Delayed Network (Sec. 5.2.4) to produce player embeddings that
we use to predict impressions. Finally, we use individual predictions of all of these
methods to build an ensemble with late fusion. The rest of this section describes each
of these methods in detail.

5.2.1

Emotion Rank

Building on extensive social science background [36, 133, 56, 64] we propose a way to
quantify interpersonal attitude using emotional responses during the game.
First we define the notions of emotion scores and emotion vectors which capture
the “amount” of emotions directed from one person to another in a period of time.
Given a dynamic interaction network GI = (VI , EI ), an emotion e ∈ E = E + ∪ E − ,
participants p1 , p2 ∈ VI , a time window τ , a weight function w associated with every
edge (probability of the given interaction), we define the emotion score (ES) as follows:
ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ ) = ±

1 X
vt (pi , e) · w(pi,t , pi,t ), (pi,t , pj,t ) ∈ EI ,
|τ | t

(5.1)

where the summation goes over the time window τ with length |τ |, and the sign
depends on the emotion e: positive if e ∈ E + and negative otherwise. We further
define the emotion vector as a vector EV (pi , pj , GI , τ ) = [ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )]e∈E of
emotions scores for all emotions considered.
Second, we discuss how to aggregate the emotion vector into a scalar in order to define
the emotion rank. For notational simplicity, we drop the parameters for EV and use
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denote EV + = [ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )]e∈E + and EV − = [ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )]e∈E − respectively to denote the positive and negative subvectors, respectively, of EV (pi , pj , GI , τ ).
We define combine the vector EV (pi , pj , GI , τ ) into a single score. This can be done
in many possible ways. We experimented with the five aggregation functions shown
below:
• f (EV ) = Ie (EV ) = ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )
• f (EV ) = max(EV + ) + min(EV − ),
• f (EV ) = avg(EV + ) + avg(EV − ),
• f (EV ) = sel(max(EV + ), min(EV − )),
• f (EV ) = sel(avg(EV + ), avg(EV − )),
where



 x1 , if x1 > −x2
sel(x1 , x2 ) =
x2 , if x1 < −x2


0, otherwise

Note that the sel function takes x1 (x1 ≥ 0) and x2 (x2 ≤ 0) as inputs, and either
returns the one whose absolute value is larger or returns 0 if their absolute values
are equal. In our case, the first function selects one of the emotion components,
the second and third aggregation functions sum up the attitudes from positive and
negative emotions to get an overall attitude, while the last two forms try to select the
valence (positive vs. negative) which is more prominent.
We are now ready to recursively define the Emotion Rank ERf (pi , pj , GI , τ ) as
ERf (pi , pj , GI , τ ) = α0 + α1 f (EV (pi , pj , GI , τ ))+
(5.2)
X ERf (pk , pj , GI , τ ) · f (EV (pk , pj , GI , τ ))
α2
+
out(pk )
k6=i,j
X  ERf (pi , pk , GI , τ ) · f (EV (pi , pk , GI , τ )) ERf (pk , pj , GI , τ ) · f (EV (pk , pj , GI , τ )) 
α3
·
out(pi )
out(pk )
k6=i,j

where f is one of the 5 aggregation functions defined above, αi ≥ 0,
out(pi ) is an out-degree of the vertex pi in the graph GI .

P

i

αi = 1, and

Intuitively, the Emotion Rank from pi to pj depends on: (1) the direct edge (pi , pj ) ∈
EI ; (2) other peoples’ Emotion Rank towards pj ; and (3) any path of length 2
(pi , pk , pj , where (pi , pk ), (pk , pj ) ∈ EI . Note that the first summation reflects the
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hypothesis that other participants’ average attitudes toward pj may influence the attitude of pi toward pj , and the rationale behind the second summation is that the
emotional attitude can “pass” along the interactions between people: if pi is positive
towards pk and pk is also positive towards pj , the impression of pj held by pi might
also shift to the positive side.
As in the case of algorithms such as PageRank [109], we calculate the Emotion Rank
values iteratively, starting with a fixed initial value and computing according to the
recursive equation (5.2) until convergence with a preset tolerance or until a maximum
number of iterations is reached. More details are presented in the Section 5.3.1.
As a result, for a given pair of players, we get the vector of values [ERf (pi , pj , GI , τ )]
over a varying set of time intervals τ spanning from 1 second to the length of the
whole video T . To make predictions for the whole video, we need to aggregate these
values into a fixed-length vector to be able to apply standard classifiers. As in [10],
we calculate histograms of these values with a fixed number of bins and use these
histograms as features for our classification task.

5.2.2

Sign Imbalance

Social scientists have studied balance theory for many years [65, 66, 43]. Intuitively,
balance theory looks at triangles in graphs. A triangle is balanced if the number of
negative edges is even (i.e. 0 or 2). In the case of weighted graphs, a triangle is
balanced if the product of the edge weights is positive, otherwise it is imbalanced.
Balance theory has been tested and validated in the study of tribes in India [147],
social networks of individuals in towns in Africa [97], how faction-faction relationships
change with the Al-Qaeda and ISIS factions ecosystem [14], and much more.
Inspired by the concept of balance in signed networks [66, 87], we define a class of
features in the following way. For a given time window τ and a given interaction graph
GI , we build a weighted multi-layer graph (V, E), where V is a set of participants,
and for every ordered pair of vertices pi , pj ∈ V there are two edges in E:
• (pi , pj )+ ∈ E with the associated weight w+ (pi , pj ) = maxe∈E + |ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )|
• (pi , pj )− ∈ E with the associated weight w− (pi , pj ) = maxe∈E − |ES(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )|
Note that w+ (pi , pj ) ∈ [0; 1] and w− (pi , pj ) ∈ [0; 1] because of the way Emotion Scores
are calculated (see Sec. 5.2.1).
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Figure 5.2: Balanced directed signed triads: for any triangle to be balanced the product of signs should be positive. These triads correspond to the following situations:
(a) a friend of my friend is my friend, (b) an enemy of my friend is my enemy, (c) a
friend of my enemy is my enemy, (d) an enemy of my enemy is my friend.
According to the balance theory in graphs [87], there are four possible balanced relations in any given triangle (Figure 5.2): a friend of my friend is my friend (Fig. 5.2a),
an enemy of my friend is my enemy (Fig. 5.2b), a friend of my enemy is my enemy
(Fig. 5.2c), and an enemy of my enemy is my friend (Fig. 5.2d). Since in our graph
every edge (pi , pj ) has a weight w(pi , pj ) ∈ [0, 1] representing the intensity of emotions
of a particular sign aligned with a given interaction, for any triangle to be balanced,
balance theory suggests that the following equality will hold:
w(pi , pj ) · w(pj , pk ) = w(pi , pk ),

(5.3)

where w corresponds to w+ or w− depending on the sign of the edge of the triangle
(Figure 5.2).
We define a sign imbalance feature for a participant pi as the average discrepancy in
balance (Eq. 5.3) over all triangles {(pi , pj ), (pj , pk ), (pi , pk )} involving pi in the graph:
SI(pi , GI , τ ) =

1
N

X

|w(pi , pj ) · w(pj , pk ) − w(pi , pk )|,

(5.4)

pj ,pk ∈V,i6=j6=k

where the summation goes over all possible triangles in the graph containing vertex
pi , N is the number of such triangles, and w corresponds to w+ or w− depending on
the sign of the edge of the triangle (Figure 5.2).
A variant would use Emotion Rank with the selector aggregation function instead of
the Emotion Score values:
• (pi , pj )+ ∈ E with the associated weight w+ (pi , pj ) = maxe∈E + |ER(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )|
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• (pi , pj )− ∈ E with the associated weight w− (pi , pj ) = maxe∈E − |ER(e, pi , pj , GI , τ )|
In this case, we need to normalize the ER values to be in the [0, 1] interval. We
obtain a feature vector for each variant of the Emotion Rank ERf .
Similar to the Emotion Rank features we aggregate the values over all possible time
windows τ by calculating histograms with a fixed number of bins. These histograms
are used for the classification task at hand.

5.2.3

Emotion and Facial Action Units alignment

The social science literature draws a connection between mutual liking between two
people and establishing rapport [141] by synchronizing body language and emotional states. A computational effort [107] also built on this idea and mined the
co-occurrence patterns between the features of two people in order to successfully
predict personality traits and behaviors.
Since we are considering a task concerning two people, we are interested in how
well their emotions and facial expressions are aligned with each other and whether
particular emotions expressed by one player cause the same or different emotions
in the other player. We use cosine distance cos(P(pi , e), P(pj , e)) as a measure of
alignment between two time series of emotions or facial action units, where P(pi , e)
is a vector of emotion or facial action unit e intensities that player pi shows, and
xT y
.
cos(x, y) = ||x||·||y||
As it usually takes time for a person to see another person’s emotional state and react
to it [124], we also consider the alignment between vector values shifted forward in
time P+∆t (pi , e) = [v∆t (pi , e), v∆t+1 (pi , e), . . . , vT (pi , e)]. To be able to compute the
cosine distance between P+∆t (pi , e) and P(pj , e)), we trim the latter to match the
length of the shifted vector.
As we also do not know the direction of the effect, i.e. whether player pi reacts to
player pj or the other way around, we also consider the alignment between vectors
shifted backwards in time by a factor ∆t as follows:
cos(P−∆t (pi , e), P(pj , e)) = cos(P(pi , e), P+∆t (pj , e)).
Finally, we form a vector AL(pi , pj , e) of cosine distances for time shifts varying from

69

CHAPTER 5. DYADIC IMPRESSION PREDICTION
−∆t to +∆t:
AL(pi , pj , e) = [cos(P−∆t (pi , e), P(pj , e)), . . . , cos(P(pi , e), P(pj , e)), . . . , cos(P+∆t (pj , e), P(pi , e))]

We also extend the definition by considering possible pairs of facial expressions for a
given pair of players AL(pi , pj , el , ek ). For the prediction task at hand, for each pair
of players we concatenate alignment vectors for different pairs of emotions or facial
action units el and ek to form a feature vector
AL(pi , pj ) = [Al(pi , pj , el , ek )], (l, k) ∈ [1, N ] × [1, N ],
where N is the number of facial expression considered.

5.2.4

Temporal Delayed Network

We leverage the concept of multi-layer networks [37, 83] as well as recent advances in
non-euclidean learning such as Graph Convolution Networks [82, 148], which have
been proved to be powerful for learning in social networks. We propose an approach to
building graphs that captures the interaction between players as well as the dynamics
of players’ behavior. We call this model a Temporal Delayed Network (TDN).
Given a dynamic interaction graph GI = (VI , EI ) (for instance, look-at graph), we
build a multi-layer network [20] G = (V, E) in the following way (Figure 5.3):
• Vertices pi,t ∈ V represent player pi ’s state at time point t.
• We introduce three types of edges E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 :
1. Interaction edges derived from the interaction graph GI : (pi,t , pj,t ) ∈ E1
if and only if (pi,t , pj,t ) ∈ EI . Interaction edges carry the same weight as
their counterparts in the interaction graph GI .
2. Identification edges connect the vertices corresponding to the same player
at different points in time: (pi,t , pi,t0 ) ∈ E2 if t0 − t ≤ Γ. Each identification
edge has associated weight exponentially decaying with difference in time
0
steps: c(pi,t , pi,t0 ) = γ t −t . This allows propagation of the player’s inner
state in time but restricts the effect of the past behaviour on the present
behaviour.
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p2,t3

p2,t1

p3,t1

p3,t3

p2,t2
p1,t3

p1,t1
p1,t2

t1

p3,t2

t2

t3

Figure 5.3: Example of a Temporal Delayed Network (TDN) for one of the games
in the dataset (best viewed in color). Thick gray edges represent the interaction
graph (in this example, look-at graph), thin orange edges represent identification
edges (connecting the same player in different layers), blue dotted edges represent
the delayed influence edges. Color intensity represents the probability of the given
interaction occurring at that time step (in other words edge weights). Here we show
a subset of players and a subset of edges for clarity.
3. Delayed influence edges build on the idea that interactions can have a
delayed effect: for instance, player pi seeing player’s pj facial expression can
affect player pi ’s impression only on the next time step. So, (pi,t , pj,t0 ) ∈ E3
if and only if (pi,t , pj,t ) ∈ E1 and (pj,t , pj,t0 ) ∈ E2 . Associated weight is
c(pi,t , pj,t0 ) = c(pi,t , pj,t0 ) · c(pj,t , pj,t0 ).
For any person pi at time t, we want to learn an embedding of the corresponding
node pi,t which contains the temporal visual information of the person, the influence
from the person to others in the group, and conversely from others in the group to
the person. These representations are further grouped pairwise to learn the dyadic
impression one person has of another.
For the sake of simplicity, we denote vertices of the network with letters u and v in the
following discussion. We use INk (v) = {u|(u, v) ∈ Ei } and OU Tk (v) = {u|(v, u) ∈
Ek } to denote the incoming and outgoing edge sets of a vertex v ∈ VI for edge type
Ek , respectively. Inspired by [159] who build spatial temporal Graph Neural Networks
to model the temporal dynamics of skeleton joints, we employ the graph convolution
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layer in our three sets of directed edges to update the node embedding xv ∈ Rm of a
vertex v:


3
X
X
X

x̃v =
c(u, v)wk (u, v)fk (xv ) +
c(v, u)wk (v, u)fk (xv ) , (5.5)
k=1

u∈INk (v)

u∈OU Tk (v)

where fk (·) is a fully connected layer, and wk (u, v) denotes the learnable weights of
the edge (u, v) ∈ Ek . We use the graph attention mechanism [148] to allow the model
to attend edge importance from the projected features:
wk (u, v) = attn(fk (xu ), fk (xv )),

(5.6)

where attn : Rn × Rn → R is the asymmetric attention block from [148]:
exp(LeakyReLU (aT [x1 ||x2 ]))
,
attn(x1 , x2 ) = P
T
x2 exp(LeakyReLU (a [x1 ||x2 ]))

(5.7)

where a ∈ R2n is a learnable attention vector, x1 , x2 ∈ Rn , and || denotes vector
concatenation. Note that for any given v, this and the normalization of c(u, v) ensures
P
P
wk (u, v) = 1 for all k.
that v c(u, v) = 1 for all u and
Finally, we update the node embedding xv using the ReLU function:
xv = ReLU (x̃v ).
After two layers of graph convolutions, we apply temporal average pooling for node
embeddings of each person:
T
1X
x̄pi =
xp .
(5.8)
T t=1 i,t
To predict whether person pi has a negative impression of the player pj , we apply the
prediction layer below to output the probability:
P (pi , pj ) = σ(oT [x̄pi ||x̄pj ]),

(5.9)

where o is the trainable projection vector, σ is the sigmoid function.

Initialization of node embeddings. We use the facial expression embeddings
[89] to initialize our node embeddings. Specifically, we remove the last fully con-
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Feature class
FAU + hist. [10]
Emotions + hist. [10]
Speech features [98]
Face features [98]
Baselines Face and speech features [98]
Speaking act [16]
VFOA [16]
VFOA-Spk-Act [16]

DIPS
(ours)

FAU alignment
EMO alignment
Emotion Rank: look-at
Emotion Rank: talk-to
Emotion Rank: listen-to
Sign Imbalace: look-at
Sign Imbalance: talk-to
Sign Imbalance: listen-to
TDN: look-at
TDN: talk-to
TDN: listen-to

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

0.612
0.584
0.589
0.589
0.595
0.574
0.501
0.587

0.581
0.555
0.514
0.519
0.523
0.506
0.522
0.513

0.594
0.600
0.563
0.574
0.555
0.538
0.547
0.506

0.567
0.577
0.562
0.535
0.552
0.533
0.511
0.525

0.586
0.595
0.577
0.569
0.569
0.555
0.554
0.545

0.609
0.579
0.608
0.566
0.605
0.584
0.545
0.614

0.597 0.685 0.623 0.727
0.565 0.627 0.598 0.626
0.562 0.588 0.573 0.580
0.577 0.577 0.570 0.583
0.571 0.583 0.578 0.578
0.564 0.595 0.558 0.586
0.560 0.598 0.578 0.609
0.568 0.576 0.555 0.599

0.627
0.583
0.583
0.558
0.605
0.561
0.563
0.588

0.676
0.597
0.573
0.572
0.593
0.572
0.592
0.581

0.635 0.574
0.615 0.638
0.649 0.611

0.606
0.626
0.605

0.577
0.610
0.610

0.617
0.612
0.633

0.633
0.573
0.630

Table 5.5: Performance (AUC) of individual features on six variables. The top eight
rows show results for baseline features. The rest of the table shows the performance
of our proposed features derived from different interaction graphs, as well as the
performance of TDN built upon these interactions graphs. On all of the variables our
proposed methods yield the best performance with statistically significant difference
over the best baseline results (p < 0.05).
nected layer of their proposed CNN and use the extracted features as our initial node
embeddings.

5.3
5.3.1

Experimental results
Experimental setup

General setup. We split the dataset into 10 folds by games. Since each player
appears in only one game, we always make predictions about players never seen
before. We use four standard classifiers for our predictions: k-Nearest Neighbor,
Logistic Regression, Gaussian Naive Bayes, and Random Forest.
As our dataset is highly imbalanced (11–23% of positive samples), we use AUC as
the performance metric. We test our proposed feature types with each of the afore73
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mentioned classifiers. We report the best AUC for any given class of features among
all classifiers.
In the case of Emotion Rank features, we initialize the values in Equation 5.2 to n1 ,
where n is the number of players in a particular game. We then iteratively calculate
the values until convergence with tolerance level 10−5 for L∞ distance between values
at the end of consecutive iterations or for up to 100 iterations.
For facial expression alignment features, we perform iterative greedy feature selection
by first considering one feature Al(pi , pj , el1 , ek1 ) at a time and then selecting the best
performing one. We then construct a concatenation of two features: the first is the
best feature from the previous stage and the second is the one discovered in the current
iteration which, when added to the feature selected in the previous iteration gives the
best result. We repeat this process until adding new features does not improve the
performance on a validation fold. We use this process instead of exhaustive search
because the number of features increases exponentially with increasing length.
For Emotion Rank and Sign Imbalance features, we consider all possible combinations
of features produced by different aggregation functions. We report the performance
of the best combination and we further analyze the influence of aggregation functions
on the performance.

Baselines. We adopted emotion and FAU histograms as described in Bai et al. [10],
speech acts, facial, and multi-modal features (face and speech) as described in Muller
et al. [98], speaking acts, the visual focus of attention (VFOA), and combined features
as described in Beyan et al. [16]. In all three cases, we used the best performing
features that we could calculate on our dataset (for instance, we did not use features
related to hand movements because not all videos contain a clear view of hands).
Since all of the aforementioned papers deal with predicting values for a single person
and our tasks are dyadic, we form dyadic features by concatenating features of a pair
of individuals just as we do with our proposed methods. We then applied the same
battery of classifiers mentioned earlier.

Temporal Delayed Network (TDN) training. We split each video into 100
clips. For each clip, we sample Γ = 5 frames (1 frame per second) to build a Temporal
Delayed Network. We set the decay rate γ = 0.8. We use two graph convolution layers
with 128 dimensions of node embeddings for both layers. Each layer is followed by
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Batch Normalization and ReLU activation. We use the Adam optimizer with learning
rate 10−4 and weight decay 10−4 . The network is trained for 200 epochs with a batch
size of 64.

5.3.2

Head to Head Feature Comparisons

First, we compare the individual performance of the proposed feature classes. Table 5.5 shows the performance (AUC) of our proposed methods compared to each
other and to the chosen set of baselines. We see that on all of the variables, at least
one of our proposed methods outperforms the baselines: TDN models yield the best
performance on two variables out of six, and FAU alignment features with greedy
feature selection performs best on the other four variables. When it comes to particular classes of features, even though Emotion Rank features and Sign Imbalance
features do not always yield the best performance, on all of the variables their results
are either on par with baseline features or higher. If we consider F1 as a metric of
interest (Table 5.6) rather than AUC, our proposed methods still yield the highest
F1-score.

5.3.3

Late fusion

Figure 5.1 shows how several individual classes of features provide predictions for our
task. To further improve performance and take advantage of the complementarity of
individual approaches, these predictions are then combined using late fusion. Given a
predicted probability pi from the i’th individual predictor, we combine the predictions
N
linearly as ΣN
i=1 wi pi (where each wi ∈ [0, 1] and Σi=1 wi = 1) to compute an overall
probability. We use a grid search over the space of possible values to find the best
wi ’s value. The best wi learned on the training and validation sets are used in
the predictions on the test set (so in particular, the test set was never used when
computing the w’s).
Table 5.7 shows the best performing ensembles for each predicted variable as well
as the results of an ablation study for those ensembles. The AUC numbers are
shown by default and F1 scores are shown in parenthesis. DIPS improves the best
baseline models by 19.9%–30.8% for AUC and 12.6%–47.2% when using the F1score metric. The improvement provides by DIPS over a baseline algorithm Base
.
w.r.t. a metric µ (e.g. AUC or F1 score) is defined to be impr = µ(DIPS)−µ(Base)
µ(Base
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Feature class
FAU + hist [10]
Emotions + hist [10]
Speech features [98]
Face features [98]
Baselines Face and speech features [98]
Speaking act [16]
VFOA [16]
VFOA-Spk-Act [16]

DIPS
(ours)

FAU alignment
EMO alignment
Emotion Rank: look-at
Emotion Rank: talk-to
Emotion Rank: listen-to
Sign Imbalace: look-at
Sign Imbalance: talk-to
Sign Imbalance: listen-to
TDN: look-at
TDN: talk-to
TDN: listen-to

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

0.306
0.266
0.302
0.310
0.307
0.291
0.246
0.295

0.318
0.301
0.269
0.277
0.269
0.245
0.202
0.267

0.239
0.225
0.217
0.221
0.190
0.198
0.190
0.179

0.318
0.341
0.300
0.285
0.313
0.291
0.262
0.308

0.207
0.212
0.198
0.194
0.184
0.201
0.175
0.191

0.350
0.365
0.369
0.360
0.363
0.360
0.290
0.388

0.337
0.298
0.264
0.277
0.290
0.290
0.254
0.286

0.243
0.274
0.293
0.294
0.304
0.302
0.296
0.309

0.252
0.237
0.212
0.198
0.214
0.203
0.198
0.212

0.299 0.269
0.280 0.222
0.292 0.216
0.330 0.196
0.320 0.185
0.303 0.175
0.293 0.201
0.330 0.210

0.372
0.354
0.358
0.344
0.349
0.343
0.325
0.365

0.350 0.323 0.243 0.352
0.403 0.359 0.263 0.365
0.378 0.357 0.242 0.368

0.238 0.410
0.249 0.403
0.234 0.358

Table 5.6: Individual features performance (F1-score) on six variables. The top eight
rows show results for baseline features. The rest of the table shows the performance
of our proposed features derived from different interaction graphs, as well as the performance of TDN built upon these interactions graphs. Our proposed methods show
statistically significant improvements (with p < 0.05) over the baseline approaches
(highlighted in the table).
Thus, if µ is AUC and DIPS and a baseline algorithm yield AUCs of 0.8 and 0.7
= 14.29%. To assess the
respectively, then the improvement ratio would be 0.8−0.7
0.1
importance of each feature in the ensemble, we exclude features one at a time, find
the performance of the reduced ensemble, and compare with the performance of the
full ensemble. The Excl. columns show the reduced performance when excluding the
specific features from late fusion. Comparing Table 5.7 with Tables 5.5 and 5.6, we
can see that ensembles significantly outperform the individual features. Of all the
types of features considered, we observe that FAU alignment features (Sec. 5.2.3) and
TDN models (Sec. 5.2.4) are the most important across all predicted variables.

5.3.4

Ablation Study

In this section, we report experiment results from our ablation study.
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Q1
Features

ER: look-at
FAU AL
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

Q2
All

Excl.

Features
ER: look-at
ER: listen-to
ER: talk-to
Emo Alignment
FAU Alignment
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

-0.014
-0.027
-0.028
-0.015
-0.036

0.744
(0.385)

Q3
Features

0.767
(0.317)

Excl.

ER: listen-to
Emo Alignment
FAU Alignment
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

-0.015
-0.006
-0.021
-0.011
-0.029
-0.010
-0.041
-0.023

0.719
(0.378)

-0.024
-0.061
-0.022
-0.032
-0.015

Features
ER: look-at
Emo Alignment
FAU Alignment
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

Q5
Features

Excl.

Q4
All

Emo Alignment
FAU Alignment
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

All

All

0.733
(0.384)

Excl.
-0.026
-0.028
-0.020
-0.027
-0.034
-0.036

Q6
All

0.778
(0.312)

Excl.
-0.022
-0.020
-0.050
-0.023
-0.028
-0.028

Features
SI: look-at
SI: listen-to
SI: talk-to
FAU Alignment
TDN: look-at
TDN: listen-to
TDN: talk-to

All

0.736
(0.441)

Excl.
-0.011
-0.009
-0.012
-0.015
-0.042
-0.002
-0.028

Table 5.7: DIPS results (AUC). For each variable we report the best combination of
features, ensemble performance (All) and drop in performance when excluding one of
the features in the combination (Excl.) with the most important feature highlighted.
We also report the F1 score for the corresponding feature late fusion model (shown in
parenthesis). Ensemble performance improvements over the best individual feature
performance are statistically significant (p < 0.01)
.

Time effect analysis
Our proposed features such as Alignment features, Emotion Rank and Sign Imbalance
features use all available video footage. We are interested in identifying which part
of the video provides the most important information for the problem of impression
prediction. In order to determine this, we ran our experiments on videos restricted to
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Figure 5.4: Time effect on the feature performance. Heatmaps show how performance
of the corresponding features drops if we restrict available video length and vary the
starting time of that video relative to the highest achieved performance (equal to 1
on heatmaps). Numbers in heatmaps are averaged over all six variables.
specific time windows defined by varying the length of the window and starting time
of the window.
Figure 5.4 shows the relative performance change we observed for various time windows.
Finding 1 We found that considering only 20% of the video yields more than 86%
of the classification performance achieved on the whole video. The longer the window
we consider, the higher the performance we get. To achieve the best result, we need
to consider the whole video. Given the same window length, we can achieve slightly
better results if we consider the second half of the game rather than the first half, but
the starting time is less important than video length.

Interaction graph effect
To analyze which of the three interaction graphs provides the best performance, we
build ensembles from features built using only one of the graphs. For each of the
look-at, listen-to, and talk-to graphs we used Emotion Rank, Sign Imbalance, and
TDN models. Table 5.8 shows the performance of corresponding ensembles for each
of the predicted variables.
Finding 2 First, we see that different features in the ensemble are complementary to
each other, as every ensemble improves upon each individual feature performance (Ta78
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ble 5.5). We also see that look-at is the least important graph when taken individually,
as ensembles based on the other two graphs outperform it on each predicted variable.
From Table 5.7, we can see that all three graphs contribute to the best performing
ensembles on each of the variables, however.

Emotions/FAU effect
To get more insight into which of the facial expressions provide the most information
to our models, we look at the combinations of FAU and emotion alignment features
that yield the best performance in our models (Table 5.5). Table 5.9 shows the most
and the least important facial action units defined by how often they occur among
the best performing expression pairs in alignment features (Sec. 5.2.3).
Finding 3 The most common pair of expressions was (AU05, AU23) suggesting that
raising of the upper lid (AU05) and tightening of lips (AU23) are the most important
FAUs. These findings are consistent with a similar analysis of Action Unit importance
in a different case, namely low rapport detection [98].

Attention weights of the Temporal Delayed Network
In this experiment, we study the learned attention weights (Equation 5.6) of interaction edges and delayed influence edges defined in Temporal Delayed Network in
Section 5.2.4. For any given dependent variable and a given graph, we first get all
pairs of people (pi , pj ) whose impression labels are predicted correctly by the trained
TDN model within the training set. Second, we compute the average attention weights
of these pairs for the two types of edges separately. The larger the average weight
of an edge, the more the trained TDN focuses on the type of edge in order to make
Interaction Graph GI
look-at
listen-to
talk-to

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

0.659 0.606 0.648 0.614 0.645 0.651
0.616 0.654 0.643 0.633 0.677 0.629
0.667 0.650 0.655 0.648 0.622 0.655

Table 5.8: Interaction graph importance: we find ensemble performance for features
obtained using only one of the interaction graphs. Features used in the ensemble:
Emotion Rank (ER), Sign Imbalance (SI) and TDN.
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FAU

Scoring player pi
Scored player pj
Overall

Emotions

Most often

Least often

Most often

Least often

AU02, AU05, AU15, AU20, AU25
AU23 AU14 AU01 AU17 AU25
AU17 AU05 AU45 AU23 AU15 AU25

AU07 AU14
AU04 AU20
AU07 AU12 AU04

Happy
Happy
Happy

Angry
Fearful
Angry

Table 5.9: Most important facial expressions in the alignment features. FAUs are
sorted in the increasing order of their occurrence among the best performing combinations (according to greedy selection process).
Q1
Graph GI
look-at
talk-to
listen-to

E1

Q2
E3

E1

Q3
E3

E1

Q4
E3

E1

Q5
E3

E1

Q6
E3

E1

E3

0.342 0.076 0.111 0.071 0.294 0.312 0.104 0.341 0.301 0.294 0.350 0.306
0.207 0.353 0.244 0.354 0.335 0.284 0.235 0.336 0.263 0.225 0.135 0.313
0.337 0.068 0.293 0.097 0.377 0.259 0.260 0.295 0.333 0.228 0.361 0.276

Table 5.10: Average attention weights of edges for correctly predicted dislike pairs.
For each variable, the left number (E1 ) shows the average attention weights for interaction edges, while the right (E3 ) shows the average attention weights for delayed
influence edges.
correct predictions. Therefore, larger numbers indicate higher importance of edges in
making predictions. Table 5.10 shows the results.
Finding 4 Comparing the two types of edges, we observe that the interaction edges
(E1 ) get more attention from TDN models than delayed influence edges (E3 ) on average.
Finding 5 Among the three types of graphs, we find that the TDN focuses more on
the interaction edges (E1 ) of the listen-to graph, while it focuses more on the delayed
influence edges (E3 ) of speak-to graphs.

Variable analysis
We want to use our experimental results to answer the question: which of the dependent variables is the hardest to predict and which is the easiest? From the results on
the performance of individual features (Table 5.5) and late fusion models (Table 5.7),
we see that our models yield the highest performance for Question 5 of the survey
(very unlikable to very likable scale). At the same time, our models perform the worst
on Question 4 (very unfriendly to very friendly scale) and Question 2 (very negative
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to very positive scale). This effect could be partly attributed to higher imbalance in
Question 5: only 12% of samples are positive for this variable, compared to 19% and
21% for Question 2 and Question 4 respectively. Another possible explanation is the
nature of the questions: it could be easier to answer such questions as to whether
a person is likable or unlikable and whether that person is pleasant or unpleasant
(Questions 5 and 3) as opposed to more vague questions such as whether a person is
positive or negative and friendly or unfriendly (Questions 2 and 4 respectively).

5.4

Conclusion

There are many applications where it is important to understand the like/dislike
relationships between people in a group. A particular case is a diplomatic or trade
negotiation between countries where it might be useful for country C1 to understand
the like/dislike relationships between people in the delegation for country C2.
In this chapter, we provide a framework called DIPS (Dyadic Impression Prediction
System). DIPS has three major innovations. First, we develop the novel concept
of emotion scores and emotion ranks that combine facial emotions with gaze networks. Second, we use social balance theory for the first time in order to propose
sign imbalance features. Third, we develop a novel TDN framework which combines
multi-layer networks with Graph Convolution Networks (unlike most past work in
computer vision that focus on GCNs alone).
We show that the DIPS framework beats out several existing baselines in predicting
dyadic impressions by 19.9%–30.8% for AUC and 12.6%–47.2% when using the F1score metric.
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Discussion and future work
6.1

Conclusion

In this thesis, we studied the following problems:
1. detecting deception from long videos of people interacting in groups,
2. detecting deception from the videos of statements by public figures,
3. predicting dyadic impression from the videos of people participating in group
interaction.
We outlined the challenges of these problems among which are:
• lack of large, diverse datasets,
• lack of methods dealing with long videos,
• lack of existing work exploiting natural group structure of the task,
• lack of methods analyzing the content of the speech that is tested for being
deceptive.
In an attempt to overcome these challenges, we made the following contributions:
• We collect a dataset of public figures from several countries worldwide making
truthful and deceptive statements. We call this the Global Political Deception
Dataset. It is the first multimodal dataset of this kind with subjects drawn from
a variety of cultures and linguistic backgrounds;
• we introduced a class of histogram-based features that build on well known lowlevel (eye/head movement, facial action units) and high-level (emotion features
from Amazon Rekognition) features to aggregate the information over the whole
length of a video,
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• we introduced a novel class of “meta-features” called LiarRank that builds on the
basic features and allows us to use group-level information to improve deception
detection in group videos,
• We proposed a way to build a graph with nodes representing videos of politicians, topics of the messages, and news articles about those politicians: this
method allows putting the content of the analyzed statement into a broader
context and assess how likely it is to be deceptive;
• We developed a novel class of features we call Deception Score that brings together intrinsic properties of the video (how likely it is to be deceptive) with
the assessment of how likely the message from the video to be deceptive;
• We suggested a set of features exploiting the group nature of the interaction to
analyze the mutual attitude of participants:
– We developed a novel class of features called emotion ranks that incorporates path in the group graph of lengths up to 3: how one player pi feels
towards player pj , how other players feel toward player pj , and finally other
players’ attitude toward player pj modulated by how player pi feels toward
those players.
– We proposed a class of features derived from the balance theory [66] that
uses signed networks [43, 50] to find the effect of a third party pk on the
impression that pi has of pj via a class of features that measure the degree
of imbalance capturing pi ’s impressions of pj vis-a-vis such third parties.
– We also used a novel class of alignment vectors that capture the alignment
— with possible temporal delays to account for subjects’ response times
— between the facial emotions and action units of subjects pi and pj .
• We introduced the novel concept of a Temporal Delayed Network which is a
multi-layer network [37, 83] where each layer represents a particular time point.
Within a single layer, nodes correspond to players, and edges correspond to different interactions between players (e.g., look at, talk to, listen to). Within
a layer, edges are labeled with the probability that the stated interaction occurs. Across layers, edges represent identity information by linking the same
individuals in different layers and delayed interaction information. We built a
Graph Convolution Network [82] with attention mechanisms [148] on top of this
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Figure 6.1: Examples of face obstruction. Top row: in a video of Atiku Abubakar
(Nigeria) giving a public speech, a banner obstructs the view of his face. Bottom row:
several examples of poor face visibility when players in the Resistance game turn their
heads away from the camera or put their hands over their face.
multi-layer network as an underlying graph. This let us learn representations
and predict dyadic impressions of pi toward pj .
• for all three tasks we considered, we introduced ensemble-based prediction models that significantly improved on existing baselines for those tasks.

6.2

Limitations

Each of the methods we proposed in this dissertation has its own set of limitations,
but some limitations are common for all of them:
• Dependence on video quality. The datasets we worked with have either HD quality (the Resistance dataset) or TV quality (Global Political Deception Dataset).
Most cameras today can record with decent resolution, but this would not be
the case if we wanted to analyze some old video footage. This limitation can
be partially alleviated by improving the quality of underlying models for facial
analysis [12, 11] (for example, by training the deep models on a set of old videos)
or by applying super-resolution techniques. There is a limit to how much we
can degrade the video until we render facial tracking or video analysis models
useless, however. For our proposed models, more research is needed to analyze
how the quality of predictions depends on the quality of the video.
• Dependence on face visibility. The same facial analysis models highly depend
on good face visibility in the analyzed videos: the entire face should be clearly
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Figure 6.2: Excluded frames rate vs. confidence scores threshold for the Global Political
Deception Dataset. We chose to use threshold of 0.75 since it allows us to keep on
average 92% of frames.
visible, looking directly at the camera or with as little rotation as possible. This
ideal situation is not always the case, as shown in Figure 6.1: people tend to
touch their faces, turn their heads, or some objects can appear between the
face and the camera. All of this makes it harder to track facial features and
decreases the quality of predictions.
To deal with the potential issues of undetected faces we rely on OpenFace
library providing confidence scores for detecting faces. We want to exclude
frames with low confidence scores. Figure 6.2 shows how the average rate of
excluded frames depends on the threshold. We chose the threshold of 0.75 that
allows us to keep on average 92% of all frames. We have not assessed, however,
how much performance deteriorates when this threshold is changed.
• Dependence on the language models. In the Resistance dataset, all participants
spoke English. In the Global Political Deception Dataset, we use automated
translation to translate non-English transcripts into English. Although current
Natural Language Processing tools cover more and more languages, some relatively rare languages do not have good models for transcribing and translating.
Acoustic and prosodic features do not depend on the language, but textual and
linguistic features use properties of spoken language to make useful representations.
• Lack of end-to-end training. We use off-the-shelf tools to extract some facial
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features [12] and hand-designed features inspired by psychological and social
studies. The rise of Deep Learning techniques, however, has shown the powerful
capabilities of deep neural networks to learn good representations directly from
data. We use end-to-end trainable models only with Temporal Delayed Network
in Chapter 5). This limitation is primarily due to lack of annotated data.

6.3

Future work

The work presented in this dissertation can be extended in several ways. We will
discuss some of the potential directions of future research.

Improving performance of existing models. One desirable direction is to advance the models proposed in this thesis to achieve better performance. This can be
done in few ways:
• Building end-to-end trainable models. This would be hard to do with the
currently available datasets due to their small size. Still, this obstacle can
be avoided by using common deep learning techniques: pretraining on larger
datasets for related tasks (e.g., emotion recognition), using transfer learning
approaches, or using self-supervised learning to exploit massive amounts of unlabeled data available online. In fact, one work on deception detection [42]
already tried applying adversarial learning to train a deep model on the small
Real-Life Trial dataset.
• Models in this thesis, as well as most other works (some examples: [106, 10, 134])
either do not use temporal information in the videos or use it on a relatively
short time scale. In our Temporal Delayed Network we use five second window
with one frame per second, Stathopoulos et al. [138] use time-series associated with the video stream but analyze at most 180 consecutive frames which
amounts to 6 seconds of video. But temporal information is an essential aspect
of the data: transition from happy to angry could be very different from the
transition from angry to happy. It could probably reveal some vital information about the subject’s inner state. And these transitions happen on multiple
scales: from momentary frown to slow change in the mood over minutes and
hours. Nevertheless, the problem of analyzing long videos is still open even in
the broader computer vision context.
86

CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK

Figure 6.3: Example of AI generated news anchor: a digital version of a regular
Xinhua news anchor named Qiu Hao. This version can deliver any news provided in
text.
Developing real-time models. Most of the works in deception detection and
social behavior analysis, including the methods proposed in this work, rely on the
whole video to make an inference. This could be useful if we want to analyze the
data retrospectively or when we have the luxury of waiting for the analysis to be
done. But in some use cases, promptly predicting in real-time can provide significant
advantages. For example, suppose we are participating in business negotiations. In
that case, we want to know whether our prospective partners are honest before making
any executive decisions. Usually, we have no time to analyze the whole conversation
before rendering the decision.
This goal could be achieved by developing models that require a shorter time window
to make a sufficiently reliable prediction. The use cases mentioned above would also
require making the models lightweight to be implemented on devices like cameras or
in video-conferencing software.

Generative tasks. There have been several prominent papers in recent years achieving photo-realistic quality of generated images of human faces [79, 80]. Following the
success of generative modeling, several research groups tried generating videos of human faces with different properties [144, 169, 58, 121]. China’s Xinhua News Agency
announced in 2018 the first AI-generated news anchor1 shown in Figure 6.3.
1

Image
credit:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/09/
worlds-first-ai-news-anchor-unveiled-in-china
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One way to extend the social behavior analysis is to apply the discriminative models in the generative setting: learning how to generate human faces that look very
realistic and behave like real humans. This behavior can include not just the ability
to show human emotions but to show the emotions in the proper context. Humans
are generally good at reading some of other people’s emotions, so we want to create
virtual faces that show happiness when the context suggests that or express sadness
and empathetical behavior when the conversation prompts that. Going beyond that,
it might be useful to create faces that show typical signs of deception, various personality traits, and other high-level psychological activity. One step further would be
generating groups of faces that would demonstrate realistic group behavior. Solving
this problem can be useful in several ways. First, for creating human-like virtual assistants to help and provide companionship. Second, the generated data and generative
models can be used to improve the quality of discriminative models further.

Analyzing the context of the interaction. One of the reasons why polygraph
test results are used with caution is that the cues used to detect deception are essentially the same as cues for being nervous or anxious. And when a subject is interrogated under a high-stake accusation, it is not surprising for the subject to become
agitated, which subsequently can be mistaken for being deceptive [73]. One of the
keys for improved models for social interaction analysis is to better understand the
interaction context. This may include analyzing the speech: performing automated
speech recognition [8, 132] followed by conversation modeling [125, 171].
Another way to incorporate the context into the model is to build a game-theoretic
model of the interaction. For example, the Resistance game can be modeled as an
asymmetric, cooperative, zero-sum sequential game. It is possible to make probabilistic inference about player roles based on the following observations only: who
went on each “mission”, the outcome of the mission (just success/fail outcome or a
detailed number of success and fail votes). From this, we can build a classifier with an
AUC of about 0.65 after the first round, which increases up to 0.8 by round 4 (under
some assumptions about how likely a spy to vote for the mission failure). Humans,
however, are not particularly good at probabilistic and Bayesian thinking [75]. And
that shows in the Resistance dataset: if we use averaged guess of the villagers about
other players’ roles, human performance after the first two rounds is as low as 0.63
AUC and only reaches 0.74 AUC by the end of the game. Accuracy of individual
guesses changing from 0.58 after the first two rounds to 0.64 after the last.
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Finally, we can take an active approach to the problem. In the previous deception
detection datasets (e.g., Columbia X-Cultural Deception Corpus [88]), subjects were
participating in an interview with the script fixed by experiment designers. Interviewers, however, could ask unexpected follow-up questions to try catching a lie.
This feature of the conversations could be improved and automated by building a
conversational agent that would generate relevant questions designed to detect potential inconsistencies. Using conversational dialog models [21, 85] in conjunction
with possible worlds approach from formal logic can be useful for this approach.

Customizing the models for cultural and individual features. One advantage of both the Resistance dataset and Global Political Deception Dataset is their
cross-cultural nature. Subjects in both datasets come from a variety of cultural and
socio-economic backgrounds across the world. This fact can be used to further improve the quality of predictions by analyzing differences between cultures and tailoring
models for each subset of data. One downside of this approach is that not very large
datasets become even smaller when divided into culture-specific subsets. We can
try to overcome this problem by employing transfer learning techniques, for example adopting approaches from cross-lingual learning in Natural Language Processing
field [119].
To go even further, we can try tailoring models for each individual. For example, when
a polygraph test is administered, the protocol requires the test to start with a set of
neutral questions designed to calibrate the subject’s physiological response [1]. Almost
all research on deception detection, starting with founding psychological works [46],
operates under the assumption that all humans exhibit the same behavior when lying.
While this is shown to be true to some extent (specifically, that some of the deception
cues are common for all humans across all cultures [46]), it is natural to expect
peculiar deceiving behavior from each person. In everyday life, we are usually much
better at spotting changes in our friends and relatives than strangers. This is because
we know how our close ones behave generally, and we can see if something is different
about them. This observation can be applied in the Machine Learning approach by
building a model specific for each subject. To be able to employ machine learning
algorithms, we need to have a significant number of samples from both positive and
negative classes. This, however, poses a challenge since without setting up a massive
human study, it is hard to obtain enough deceitful statements from a single person. It
is usually much easier to get truthful videos from a person (for example, in the context
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of political deception, we can mine hundreds of hours of video with any public figure
where there is no reason to suspect lies, e.g., personal interviews). Since the number
of samples where the subject lies is still extremely limited, we cannot use a supervised
learning approach in this setting. Instead, the automated deception detection can be
posed as the anomaly detection problem [153, 110] or few-shot learning problem [44].
In this way, we don’t need deceitful samples at the training stage. In addition to that,
the act of lying can be considered anomalous with respect to everyday behavior.

Exploring other personality traits and interpersonal communication features. The other side of the deception coin is trust. One question that could be
approached is: can we predict if a person A would trust person B after some interaction history. This problem could be posed in a variety of ways in terms of what is
the input data for the algorithm: (1) can we predict trust by looking at person B’s
appearance (in other words, how trustworthy that person looks), (2) can we predict
trust by looking at person A’s appearance (in other words, how skeptical that person
looks), (3) can we improve the prediction quality by looking at both participants and
other group members.
The Resistance dataset contains ratings for trust between players. Additional relevant
data can be mined from various TV game shows, where players have to trust each
other to achieve common goal: “Golden Balls”1 (UK), “Shafted”2 (UK), “Friend or
Foe?”3 (USA), “Take It All”4 (USA), “The Bank Job”5 (UK). In these games, players
have to participate in a generalized Prisoners Dilemma to maximize their winnings.
This fact invites several research questions: given a video of the game (1) will player
A trust player B, (2) will player B trust player A, (3) will they betray each others’
trust?

Group Deception prediction In this thesis (Chapter 3) we predict whether a
given player pi is a spy in the game. We know, however, that there are several spies
in the game. Suppose there are N players and K of them are spies, and we have
predicted probabilities for each player P (pi ) to be a spy. Then for a given group of
1

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1186336/
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0302191/
3
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0320860/
4
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2486556/
5
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2513534/
2
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K people, the probability that all of them are spies is equal to
P(

K
[

{pij }) =

j=1

K
Y

P (pij ).

(6.1)

j=1

Thus, knowing K we can predict a group of spies to be the subset of K players with
the highest joint probability.
Kumar et al. [86] observed that in the Resistance-game-like situation where there
are two groups of adversarial agents, behavioral patterns differ for participants from
different groups. For instance, spies tend to look at each other significantly less than
at other players. On the other hand, villagers do not discriminate in attention between
spies and other villagers (because they don’t know other players’ roles). This brings
us to a hypothesis that knowing the number of spies in the game we can exploit the
interaction dynamics within the group to predict on a subset level rather than on an
individual level so that the probability of the group to be spies is higher than the
simple joint probability (Eq. 6.1). This would not be the first attempt to do so, as Yu
et al. [162] employed a similar attitudinal analysis to identify a cluster of adversarial
players in a similar game, but this will be the first application of this approach to
video data and the first one that takes temporal aspect into account.
This could be done, for example, by building a multi-layer network, where layers
will represent a variety of automatically inferred social interactions such as gaze and
its derivative (addressed speech, auditory attention) [11], relative expressed dominance [10], expressed relative nervousness, and dyadic impressions (Chapter 5).

Human decision anticipation Humans naturally desire to be able to predict other
humans’ actions and decisions beforehand. Some attempts at automatic prediction of
humans’ decisions we explored in a variety of settings such as social dilemma [68] and
negotiations [111]. One more situation where such predictions could be of significant
interest is gambling. One recent study [149] explored a possibility of automated
predicting what action a poker player will make several seconds ahead of the action:
fold, call, or raise. For this study the authors conducted an experiment where human
subjects were playing a simplified version of the poker game: in each round, each
player received a single card, then after a series of actions (raise, call, fold) the
player with the highest card won the pot. The authors use automatically detected
facial action units and random forest models to predict whether a player will fold or
raise/call in his next action.
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We hypothesise that model performance on this task can be greatly improved if group
nature and the context of the interaction is taken into account: the way players looks
at each other, the way players react to other players decisions can help us anticipate
what each player will do even before that action happens. We can also enhance the
predictive ability of the model by incorporating domain knowledge and observable
information such as player’s bank, game history including opened cards and player
bets.

Interpretability of predictions. With the rise of deep learning, researchers started
worrying about the lack of interpretability in deep neural networks, especially in high
stakes applications such as medicine [161]. Interpretable models, however, come with
various trade-offs with regards to performance or security [166]. There has been some
efforts at providing post hoc interpretability [62]. Since detecting deception is usually
crucial in high-stakes situations (in the court of law, in important negotiations, etc.),
it is just as important to explain why the model predicts someone to be deceptive
and provide levels of uncertainty in the prediction.
One more way to achieve interpretability in deception detection systems is to improve
fine-grained deception analysis. Our proposed work (Chapter 3) makes predictions
about deceptive behavior about the whole video. Instead, it would be advantageous
to pinpoint specific statements or actions that are predicted to be false. The Box-ofLies dataset [52] is developed for this kind of task: it contains dense annotations for
deception in conversations.

6.4

Social and ethical implications.

Finally, we want to discuss some ethical and social implications of computational
social science research. No technological advances stay isolated in laboratories or
conference papers. They usually get implemented and applied in real life wherever it
is economically feasible and prove useful: increasing income or reducing expenses. But
more often than not, the straightforward applications of these advances disregard the
social impact and ethical considerations. For example, facial recognition technologies
are known to work significantly better on Caucasian people, which leads to racial
discrimination [7]. Figure 6.4 shows how image super-resolution makes a Caucasian
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Figure 6.4: One of the examples of biased models: this image of unpixelated Barack
Obama face was produced using models by Menon et al. [94] and is clearly showing
a Caucasian man.
male from the pixelated photo of Barack Obama1 . This problem also affects any
technology that relies on facial analysis: detecting and tracking faces and detecting
facial expressions and emotions. Audio analysis is not immune from this problem
either, as well as textual analysis, which could be affected by a variety of variables,
for example, if English is not a native language for a subject.
Ford [57] discusses legal use of the deception detection. Currently, in the U.S., 27
states and D.C. do not allow polygraph examination as evidence in criminal trials,
while 22 states allow it. While Supreme Court decisions ruled denying lie detector
evidence unconstitutional, the bar for the acceptance is very high as most legal scholars agree on the lack of reliability of polygraphs. One major flaw that is attributed
to this type of lie detectors is that they were mostly tested on white males [6] and
do not take into account a lot of confounding factors that can affect the predictions2 .
The same problem, obviously, concerns systems performing automated deception detection from videos. Current suggested models are trained on very small datasets (by
modern Deep Learning standards). They lack the necessary diversity to be trustworthy in situations where human freedom or even life is at stake.
Even outside of the legal system, deception detection technology can be used rather
recklessly. For example, in the recent TV show “Roswell: The Final Verdict”3 producers used deception detection tools to analyze the video recordings of witness testimonies about alleged UFO crashes in Roswell, New Mexico in 1947. Some of the
1

Image credit: https://twitter.com/Chicken3gg/status/1274314622447820801
State v. Anthony, 100 N.M. at 738, 676 P.2d at 265
3
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt14821454/

2
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stories explored in the series were in the form “Person X told me there was [he/she
saw] an object Y”. And when the deception detection system produced a negative
result for lying, producers of the show presented the finding as verification that there
was indeed an object Y. Correct interpretation, however, would be at best that there
are no signs of deception in that statement (which does not automatically make the
statement true). At worst, that would mean Person X indeed told the witness about
the object Y. This finding still does not rule out many possibilities from Person X
being delusional to him plain lying to the witness.
This kind of irresponsible use of automated human behavior analysis tools (not just
lie detectors but also personality traits detectors and others) can harm subjects.
Publishing an unreliable detection of lies in some politician’s speech can doom that
politician’s career. Unreliable results of personality traits prediction or mistakes in
anxiety detection in children can result in biased attitudes from peers and teachers.
But this can also bring harm to the field of research by discrediting the technology
and scientific findings because of several high-profile wrong predictions.
These concerns raise the question: what to do? We see at least two measures that
should be taken to avoid negative consequences. These two measures answer questions
“how to develop models?” and “how to use models?”

How to develop models? First and foremost, we need to create more diverse
datasets containing enough samples for each confounding variable: race, gender, culture, age, and others. The Resistancedataset and our Global Political Deception Dataset
try to achieve that goal. This, however, is not enough. When one of Deep Learning
most prominent researchers, Yann LeCun phrased the problem as “ML systems are
biased when data is biased”1 , a lot of researchers replied that some Machine Learning
models have inductive biases and making perfectly unbiased datasets is not just impossible but would not even be enough [135] (see also discussion under Yann LeCun’s
tweet). Building unbiased models, however, is a whole major research area and is
outside of the scope of this dissertation.

How to use models? When using statistical models, it is vital to understand the
limitations of technologies at hand (cf. Section 6.2) to make sure the model is used
in a proper context: it is used for the same task the model was built for, it is used on
data that has a similar distribution to the data the model was trained on, assumptions
1

https://twitter.com/ylecun/status/1274782757907030016
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that were put in the model are met. Another critical point is the interpretation of the
results: if the model predicts that a subject is deceptive with a probability 0.6, that
should not warrant immediate accusation in lying. Conversely, if the model shows
40% chance of lying, that does not necessarily mean the subject is telling the truth.
Finally, it is essential not to conflate truthful statements about facts with the veracity
of said facts.
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Samuel Rota Bulò, Cees Snoek, Oswald Lanz, Stefano Messelodi, and Nicu
Sebe, editors, Image Analysis and Processing – ICIAP 2019, pages 421–431,
Cham, 2019. Springer International Publishing.
[5] Oya Aran and Daniel Gatica-Perez. One of a kind: Inferring personality impressions in meetings. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM on International Conference
on Multimodal Interaction, ICMI ’13, pages 11–18, New York, NY, USA, 2013.
[6] American Medical Association. Polygraph. Council on Scientific Affairs. JAMA,
256(9):1172–1175, Sep 1986.
[7] Fabio Bacchini and Ludovica Lorusso. Race, again: how face recognition technology reinforces racial discrimination. Journal of Information, Communication
and Ethics in Society, 17(3):321–335, August 2019.
[8] Alexei Baevski, Henry Zhou, Abdelrahman Mohamed, and Michael Auli.
wav2vec 2.0: A framework for self-supervised learning of speech representations, 2020.
[9] Chongyang Bai, Maksim Bolonkin, Judee Burgoon, Chao Chen, Norah Dunbar, Bharat Singh, V. S. Subrahmanian, and Zhe Wu. Automatic long-term
96

BIBLIOGRAPHY
deception detection in group interaction videos. In Proceedings - 2019 IEEE
International Conference on Multimedia and Expo, ICME 2019, Proceedings
- IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo, pages 1600–1605.
IEEE Computer Society, July 2019.
[10] Chongyang Bai, Maksim Bolonkin, Srijan Kumar, Jure Leskovec, Judee Burgoon, Norah Dunbar, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Predicting dominance in multiperson videos. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-19, pages 4643–4650. International Joint
Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 7 2019.
[11] Chongyang Bai, Srijan Kumar, Jure Leskovec, Miriam Metzger, Jay F. Nunamaker, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Predicting the visual focus of attention in
multi-person discussion videos. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-19, pages 4504–4510.
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 7 2019.
[12] Tadas Baltrusaitis, Amirali Bagher Zadeh, Yao Chong Lim, and Louis-Philippe
Morency. Openface 2.0: Facial behavior analysis toolkit. In 13th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition (FG 2018), pages
59–66, 2018.
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deception detection in dialogues. 2019 Annual Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2019.
[53] Kexin Feng and Theodora Chaspari. A review of generalizable transfer learning
in automatic emotion recognition. Frontiers in Computer Science, 2:9, 2020.
101

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[54] Sinead V. Fernandes and Muhammad S. Ullah. Use of machine learning for
deception detection from spectral and cepstral features of speech signals. IEEE
Access, 9:78925–78935, 2021.
[55] Corneliu Florea, Laura Florea, Mihai Badea, Constantin Vertan, and Andrei
Racoviteanu. Annealed label transfer for face expression recognition. 2018.
[56] Kory Floyd and Judee K. Burgoon. Reacting to nonverbal expressions of liking: A test of interaction adaptation theory. Communication Monographs,
66(3):219–239, 1999.
[57] Elizabeth B. Ford. Lie detection: Historical, neuropsychiatric and legal dimensions. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 29(3):159–177, 2006.
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E. Fox, and R. Garnett, editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, volume 32. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019.
[161] Chang Ho Yoon, Robert Torrance, and Naomi Scheinerman. Machine learning
in medicine: should the pursuit of enhanced interpretability be abandoned?
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2021.
[162] Dian Yu, Yulia Tyshchuk, Heng Ji, and William Wallace. Detecting deceptive
groups using conversations and network analysis. In Proceedings of the 53rd
Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics and the 7th
International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing, pages 857–866,
July 2015.
[163] Ramin Zabih and John Woodfill. Non-parametric local transforms for computing visual correspondence. In European conference on computer vision, pages
151–158. Springer, 1994.
[164] Le Zhang, Songyou Peng, and Stefan Winkler. Persemon: A deep network for
joint analysis of apparent personality, emotion and their relationship. IEEE
Transactions on Affective Computing, pages 1–1, 2019.
114

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[165] Lingyu Zhang, Indrani Bhattacharya, Mallory Morgan, Michael Foley,
Christoph Riedl, Brooke Welles, and Richard Radke. Multiparty visual cooccurrences for estimating personality traits in group meetings. In Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision
(WACV), March 2020.
[166] Xinyang Zhang, Ningfei Wang, Hua Shen, Shouling Ji, Xiapu Luo, and Ting
Wang. Interpretable deep learning under fire. In Proceedings of the 29th
USENIX Security Symposium, Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 1659–1676. USENIX Association, 2020.
[167] Yanxia Zhang, Jeffrey Olenick, Chu-Hsiang Chang, Steve W. J. Kozlowski, and
Hayley Hung. Teamsense: Assessing personal affect and group cohesion in small
teams through dyadic interaction and behavior analysis with wearable sensors.
Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol., 2(3), September 2018.
[168] Zhi Zhang, Vartika Singh, Thomas E. Slowe, Sergey Tulyakov, and Venugopal
Govindaraju. Real-time automatic deceit detection from involuntary facial expressions. In 2007 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, June 2007.
[169] Hang Zhou, Yu Liu, Ziwei Liu, Ping Luo, and Xiaogang Wang. Talking face
generation by adversarially disentangled audio-visual representation. In AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019.
[170] Lina Zhou, Judee K. Burgoon, and Douglas P. Twitchell. A longitudinal analysis of language behavior of deception in e-mail. In Hsinchun Chen, Richard
Miranda, Daniel D. Zeng, Chris Demchak, Jenny Schroeder, and Therani Madhusudan, editors, Intelligence and Security Informatics, pages 102–110, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2003. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[171] Henghui Zhu, Feng Nan, Zhiguo Wang, Ramesh Nallapati, and Bing Xiang.
Who did they respond to? conversation structure modeling using masked hierarchical transformer. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 34(05):9741–9748, Apr. 2020.
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